Household savings and portfolio choice by Klein, Sean Patrick
Household Savings and Portfolio Choice
by
Sean Patrick Klein
B.A. Business Economics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2005
M.A. Economics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2005
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
at the
MASSACHUISETS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
MAR 11 2010
LIBRARIES
ARCHIVES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
January, 2010
© Sean Patrick Klein, MMX. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and electronic
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Author........................................
Certified by....................................................
Certified by...........................................
Department of Economics
(tart 15, 2010
James Poterba
Mitsui Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor
Amy Finkelstein
Professor of Economics
GIesis Suvervisor
Accepted by............................................
Esther Duflo
Abdul Latif Jameel Professor of Poverty Alleviation and Development Economics
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Studies
- %_1
2
Household Savings and Portfolio Choice
by
Sean Patrick Klein
Submitted to the Department of Economics
on January 15th, 2010, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays that examine household savings and portfolio choice
behavior. Chapter One analyses the effects of employer matching contributions and tax
incentives on participation and contribution behavior in employer-sponsored 401(k)
savings plans. Employer sponsored retirement savings plans consist of several different
incentives designed to increase employee savings, including matching contributions,
tax deductibility, and tax free compounding. There is a substantial literature on the
effects of match rates on retirement savings, but little on the effects of preferential tax
treatment. This chapter provides estimates of the impact of employer matching and tax
deductibility on retirement savings using a uniquely suited dataset from a large United
States Corporation. I estimate that the effect of a one percentage point change in the
match rate corresponds to a 0.06 percentage point increase in savings plan participation
rates, while a similar one percentage point increase in marginal tax rates increases
participation by 1.35 percentage points. Changes in the match rate have an
insignificant effect on contribution rates (conditional on participation), though a one
percentage point change in marginal tax rates tends to increase contribution rates by
0.16 percentage points. The effects of the match rate and marginal tax rate are
transformed into changes in the annualized rate of return of the savings plan and this
disparity remains. Finally, these estimates are used to calculate the changes in wealth at
retirement due to changes in match rates and marginal tax rates under a variety of
parameterizations.
Chapter Two examines the trading and contribution behavior of employees
participating in the 401(k) plan at a large United States corporation. This corporation
offers employer matching contributions in company stock, and employees are
prohibited from trading the matching contributions for an extended period. The
empirical work details evidence of rebalancing behavior that is impacted by vesting
restrictions and within-firm variation in match rates. Employees are between 3 and 7
percentage points more likely to rebalance their retirement portfolio once matching
contributions have fully vested, and an additional 6 to 11 percentage points more likely
if they face a 100% match rate relative to a 50% match rate. Variation in match rates also
leads to changes in composition of employee contributions: increases in the match rate
lead to decreases in the amount of company stock that the employee purchases with
their own funds. Employees are between 13 and 19 percentage points less likely to
contribute their own income to the matched asset and, if they still contribute to
company stock, the employee's own-money contributions in company stock fall by
between 13 and 18 percentage points. Together, these estimates provide evidence that
employee contribution and rebalancing behavior is altered by asset-specific matching
contributions and by restrictions on the trade of particular assets.
Chapter Three uses data from multiple panels of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation to identify the effect of unemployment insurance benefits on household
savings behavior. This chapter extends existing literature on precautionary savings
and insurance to allow for the fact that insurance benefits are multi-dimensional,
including replacement rates and benefit durations; incorporates additional econometric
methods to accommodate the skewness and variation in household savings; allows for
heterogeneous savings responses based on the likelihood of the insured risk through a
two-step estimation procedure; and by allowing insurance benefits to affect the level
and composition of assets by analyzing changes in the composition of the household's
portfolio across assets that are likely (or unlikely) to represent precautionary savings. I
find suggestive evidence of quantitatively large reductions in precautionary savings
behavior in response to variation in both replacement rates and benefit durations,
though these results are not statistically distinguishable from zero. The negative effect
of benefit increases on savings is magnified for households at greater risk of
unemployment, and for the households with below median levels of financial wealth,
though again these results are statistically insignificant once standard errors are
properly adjusted. These extensions do not provide enough power to detect savings
responses to variation in insurance benefits at standard levels of confidence, despite
point estimates that represent economically large responses.
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Title: Mitsui Professor of Economics
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Introduction
Economists and policymakers have focused a great deal of attention over the years on
household savings behavior. There are many examples of programs and subsidies that
are explicitly designed to increase or otherwise alter household savings, and there is
much literature on the effectiveness of these policies and the household's responses to
various incentives within the plan.
The research in this thesis consists of three empirical studies that describe how
households respond to various savings incentives. The first chapter discusses how
households respond to tax benefits in 401(k) savings plans relative to their response to
employer matching contributions. The second chapter looks at the allocation of 401(k)
portfolios and household rebalancing behavior in the face of restrictions on trade and
asset-specific matching contributions. The third chapter investigates how household
savings behavior is altered by the presence of insurance, how these effects can differ
across households, and how this can differ within the household's portfolio.
In the United States, 401(k) pension plans are savings vehicles that allow participating
employees to save for retirement while avoiding taxation on both the initial wage
income and the subsequent capital income accumulation. In exchange, the employee
loses access to the savings in their 401(k) plan until they reach retirement age. 401(k)
plans are largely sponsored by employers: often the employer further encourages
employee participation in and contributions to the 401(k) plan by a variety of means.
One of the most common examples is "matching". Employers can choose to match part
or all of employee contributions to the 401(k) plan with additional funds.
The first chapter in this thesis analyzes the relative impact of the tax benefits and
matching benefits in 401(k) savings plans on employee participation and contribution
rates. While the matching and tax benefits are both designed to increase the
attractiveness of saving within 401(k) plans, they encourage savings in very different
ways. The matching benefits are straightforward: employee contributions are increased
by the employer's matching contributions, and the account balance is immediately
increased. The tax benefits are more subtle. Employees avoid initial taxation of 401(k)
contributions, and receive a higher annual rate of return due to the tax free
compounding of account assets. The bulk of the tax benefits depend on future rates of
return, and are not realized in the savings account for an extended period of time.
Given these differences (and many others), there is reason to believe that employees
respond to these two incentives in different ways. Instrumental variables regression
results show that employees increase participation rates in response to increases in
matching and increases in tax rates, and that the increases in participation due to
variation in tax rates is much larger than the increases due to match rates. This remains
true once these effects are translated into changes in the internal rate of return of the
401(k) plan. Increases in tax rates also increase employee contributions conditional on
participation, while increases in match rates have essentially no effect on conditional
contribution behavior. Both of these mechanisms are designed to make 401(k) savings
accounts more appealing to employees, though the tax deductibility of contributions
and tax free compounding of plan assets seem to generate much larger behavioral
responses than the match rate.
The second chapter in this thesis examines household portfolio choice behavior inside
401(k) plans. Matching contributions in 401(k) plans often are awarded in a particular
asset (frequently the common stock of the employer), and these asset-specific matching
contributions have restrictions on trade, known as "vesting" requirements, to prevent
immediate trade of the matching contributions. In general, employees should prefer
cash to the asset-specific match, particularly in the case of matching contributions in the
common stock of the employer: an individual corporation's common stock is very
volatile, much of that volatility can be diversified away with the purchase of an index,
and, perhaps most importantly, the common stock of the employer is highly correlated
with an employee's labor income. This chapter examines how employees adjust their
contribution and rebalancing behavior in response to variation in vesting restrictions
and the rate of employer matching in company stock. The empirical results suggest
that employees are much more likely to rebalance their portfolio when vesting
restrictions are lifted, they become even more likely to rebalance as match rates
increase, and that the rebalance events consist of trades out of the employer's common
stock. Employees also appear to adjust the allocation of their contributions in response
to variation in the match rate: higher match rates are associated with a decrease in the
probability that employees contribute to company stock. These results suggest that
asset allocation constraints such as vesting requirements and asset-specific matching
contributions significantly impact the portfolio behavior of employees within 401(k)
plans.
In addition to policies designed to directly impact household savings such as 401(k)
plans, there are many programs which alter savings incentives in more subtle ways. If
households self-insure against future financial shocks, then the presence of insurance
(and variation in the generosity of insurance) will change savings behavior. In the
United States, the vast majority of employees are eligible for unemployment insurance
benefits that are designed to help households smooth consumption in the event of a
separation from the labor force. Unemployment insurance benefits are set annually in
each state, and the resulting variation in the generosity of the insurance across
otherwise similar households is one of the principal reasons why unemployment
benefits are an appealing tool that can be used to assess the savings responses of
households to insurance benefits.
The third chapter of this thesis explores household savings behavior in response to
variation in unemployment insurance benefits. To the extent that households self
insure against unemployment spells, increases in insurance generosity will lead to
decreases in household capital accumulation. This chapter searches for evidence of this
effect using variation in unemployment insurance benefits through the replacement rate
and through the maximum eligible benefit duration across states and over time. This
chapter also allows for household savings responses to vary with the likelihood of the
insured risk by identifying households at relatively low and relatively high risk of
unemployment based on observables. Finally, given that particular types of assets are
more appealing for precautionary capital accumulation than others; this chapter allows
households to save at different rates across asset types. These extensions provide
qualitatively large but statistically insignificant estimates for the savings responses of
households with respect to insurance benefits, which increase further amongst
households at higher risk of unemployment.
Chapter 1
1 Match Rates, Marginal Tax Rates, and
Retirement Savings
1.1 Introduction
In most developed countries, individuals have access to a variety of subsidized and tax
advantaged retirement savings vehicles. Two common examples of such accounts in
the United States are employer-provided 401(k) savings plans and Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Both 401(k) plans and IRAs provide the individual with a
means to defer taxation on capital accumulation (these accounts are often referred to as
"Tax Deferred" accounts, or TDAs). These accounts, and 401(k) plans in particular, are
a package of benefits that incorporate price distortions on several different margins.
Contributions to 401(k) accounts are often matched by employers up to certain limits,
contributions are tax deductible up to certain limits, interest and capital gains are
allowed to accumulate without taxation, and the assets that the household can purchase
within the accounts are often restricted. There is a detailed existing literature on the
effect of match rates on the amount, timing and composition of household savings
inside and outside of these accounts, while there is substantially less known about the
impact of the tax deductibility and tax free compounding on savings behavior. This is
especially unusual as the tax deductibility and tax-free compounding of contributions
have consequences for the government budget constraint in addition to the standard set
of motives to increase retirement savings that are seen in the existing match rate
literature.
Estimating the effects of tax deductibility on retirement savings places considerable
demands on the data. In addition to accurately measuring the effects of match rates on
savings behavior across employees, the data must include information on enough
employees over enough time to contain meaningful, plausibly exogenous variation in
marginal tax rates. Often, this variation can be found by comparing employees across
states and years, but geographically and temporally diverse employees are generally
exposed to variation in 401(k) plan rules and restrictions, which have a confounding
influence on resulting empirical work. This paper utilizes data that can address these
issues.
The information on participation and contribution behavior comes from a human
resources dataset at a Fortune 500 company in the United States ("Company" hereafter),
including detail on annual wages through the employee's W2 forms, demographic
characteristics of the employee and their household, insurance elections, and the
amount and composition of retirement savings. The Company offers different match
rates to different employees, but offers the same core 401(k) plan to all employees. The
variation in match rates allows for identification of the effects of employer matching on
savings outcomes that can be grounded in the existing literature. Data on employees
across states and over time allows for identification of the effects of marginal tax rates,
and the homogeneity of plan rules and options across employees and over time avoids
many of the potential confounding influences of nuisance variation in plan restrictions,
portfolio selection, rebalancing rules, vesting rules, and loan availability. This paper
utilizes this rich dataset and provides estimates of the effect of match rates and
marginal tax rates on 401(k) participation and contribution rates, compares these
estimates to one another based on the implied effect of annualized rates of return within
the savings plan, and then calculates changes in wealth at retirement due to changes in
match rates and marginal tax rates.
This paper is divided into six sections. The first section illustrates the effects of match
rates and marginal tax rates on wealth at retirement. The second section describes the
dataset used in the estimation procedure, including the details of the 401(k) savings
plan. The third section characterizes the identification strategy and estimation
equations. The fourth section contains the empirical results. The fifth section uses the
empirical results to calculate of policy and parameter chances on retirement wealth.
The final section concludes the paper and provides suggestions for future research.
1.2 Illustration of Benefits
Tax deductibility, tax free compounding, and employer matching contributions are
designed to increase the implicit rate of return on savings for retirement. These
benefits accomplish this objective in very different ways. The benefits from employer
matching contributions are realized by the employee immediately. Their retirement
contribution is increased by the matching percentage at the time of contributions (or
shortly thereafter). In contrast, the bulk of the benefits from tax deductibility are due to
the tax free compounding of annual returns as shown in Poterba (2004).
Employer matching contributions increase the retirement account balance at the
moment of the contribution. An employee eligible for match rate m, that is saving for
retirement T periods in the future, can expect (1 + m)(1 + r)T dollars at retirement for
each dollar contributed today, where r is the annualized (for simplicity here a non-
stochastic) rate of return. Holding all other effects fixed, the benefits of the 401(k) plan
to the employee are always (1 + m): savings for retirement at a 100% match rate implies
the employee has twice the account balance relative to a 0% match rate. That is, without
the match, the agent will receive (1 + r)T dollars at retirement, and the relative benefits
of the matching on the marginal dollar saved can be expressed as:
balance with match (1 + m)(1 + r)T
matc h balance without match (1 + r)T
Which reduces to:
1. Bmatc h = 1 + m
Tax deductibility and tax free compounding are more subtle. Employees that face a
fixed marginal tax rate of r receive some benefits today (through the time zero tax
deductibility of their contributions), but the majority of the benefits are due to tax
deferred compounding of returns. An employee saving the equivalent of one dollar
after tax for retirement T periods in the future can expect
1 ret (1 + r)T
dollars at retirement. The 1-r represents the immediate tax deduction that the agent
receives for the savings at time zero as it would take 1 times as many taxable dollars
outside of the tax-sheltered account to equal 1 dollar inside of the account. The
(1 - Tret) term represents the taxation of the account upon withdrawal at retirement. In
the absence of tax free compounding, the rate of return falls from (1 + r)T to (1 + (1 -
T)r)T. Altogether, the change in the account balance at retirement due to tax
deductibility and tax free compounding is:
B balance with tax benefits 1 ret (1 + r)T
tax balance without tax benefits (1 + (1 - T)r)T
Or,
2. Btax = 1Tret [ + r ]T
1-x (1+(1-r)r)
Note that this amount depends on r and T, two parameters which were not present in
the expression of benefits due to the match rate in equation (1). 1 Cases which allow
lifecycle variation in marginal tax rates, stochastic rates of return, and endogenous
withdrawal dates are more complex, but the form of the relative benefit calculations for
1 Poterba (2004) provides a detailed walkthrough of these calculations in continuous time.
22
match rates and marginal tax rates remain very different. The benefits due to matching
contributions are more predictable given the information available to the employee and
are realized in the account at the time of investment; while the benefits due to favorable
tax treatment depend greatly on the ultimate realizations of withdrawal dates, marginal
tax rates, and rates of return, and are realized largely at future dates.
Combining the benefits due to matching and the benefits due to tax deductibility, the
benefits of savings in an employer-matched 401(k) plan in terms of relative account
balance upon withdrawal can be calculated as:
balance with plan _1 -t (1 + m)(1 + r)T
B4 i (k=) balance without plan (1 + (1 - r)r)T
1-Tret (1+m)(1+r)T
3. B401(k) - 1-1
Table I contains sample calculations of these relative balances for some plausible values
of m, t, r, r and Tret. Small changes in the interest rate and time to withdrawal have
substantial effects on the relative value of the tax benefits of saving in a 401(k) plan,
while the additional benefits of matching contributions are fixed for all time and
interest rate pairs. Matching contributions and tax deductibility are two ways that
employees are encouraged to participate in retirement savings plans. Variation in
match rates and marginal tax rates affect the relative benefits of retirement savings
plans in very different ways. The goal of this paper is to estimate and compare the
effects of marginal tax rates and match rates on employee participation and
contribution behavior in employer-sponsored 401(k) plans, and the effects of variation
in these two measures on employee wealth at retirement.
1.3 The Data
The data used in this paper is human resources and benefits data from a large, United
States based corporation. The Company is a Fortune 500 enterprise in the
manufacturing sector. The data includes information on employees such as their date
of birth, tenure with the Company, wages (from W2 forms), gender, and location.
Information on marital status and the number of dependents is inferred from health
insurance elections made by the employee. Finally, the data also include information
on the matching schedule available to each employee, the employee's own-money and
total contributions to the retirement savings plan, and the allocation of their assets
within the plan.
I analyze savings decisions by all salaried, full time, active employees who have at least
one full year of information in the Company data. While there are more hourly
workers than salaried workers at this firm, the salaried workers appear more
homogenous across covariates and job descriptions. At the same time, there is more
variation in incomes (and hence marginal tax rates) amongst salaried employees. The
ultimate sample is a pooled cross section of 39,331 employee-years spanning 38 states
during the years 2003-2006.
I compare outcomes across several different groups of employees. The identification of
the effects of the match rate comes from two different match rates in the Company:
3,377 employee-years are offered a 50% match, and 35,954 are offered a 100% match
rate. Note that all of the variation in match rates examined in this paper is on the
intensive margin. There is evidence that the effects of savings incentives vary across the
intensive and extensive margins (Papke and Poterba 1995; Papke 1995; Kusko, Poterba,
and Wilcox 1994). As the relevant variation in marginal tax rates occurs on the
intensive margin, comparisons of the effects of match rates and marginal tax rates
resulting from this data are free of confounding effects resulting from comparing two
substantively different types of variation.2
Table II contains summary statistics on the demographic composition of the sample of
interest, and summary statistics on savings outcomes alongside similar information
from independent data at the Employee Benefits Research Institute (EBRI). Employees
that are offered a 50% match rate on average earn less than employees with 100% match
rates and have worked for the firm for a shorter period of time. Compared to the
independent EBRI sample, this data contains employees that are slightly older, have
longer tenure at the firm, and have higher annual incomes.
1.4 Retirement Savings Plan Details
Each year, the Company distributes benefits information to employees. This includes a
Summary Plan Description ("SPD") for the 401(k) plan. The SPD contains detailed
information on the benefits of saving within the plan, including specific examples on
the effect of tax deductibility on the employee's take home pay and plan savings, the
associated pre-tax dollar limit for that year, and the relevant compensation limits from
the Internal Revenue Service. Employees may enroll in the plan at any time by
telephone or through the internet. Employees may then adjust, stop, or resume their
pre-tax and after-tax contribution elections at any time via telephone or internet.
The investment options are clearly detailed within the SPD, including brief descriptions
of each fund and the appropriate ticker symbol and website. In 2007, there were eleven
funds that employees could choose from, as well as the Company's publicly traded
common stock, and a self-directed brokerage plan through a third party organization.
The 401(k) enrollment website also contains current and historical performance data for
2 Of the 39,331 employee-year observations, only 83 (0.21%) have estimated marginal tax rates less than or
equal to zero.
each security in the investment set. Dividends are automatically reinvested in the
source fund. Employees may alter their contribution portfolio or their overall portfolio
at any time, with the exception of matching funds that may only be transferred after a
vesting period of two years or if the employee is over the age of 55, in which case they
may be freely traded at any time.
In addition to match rates and marginal tax rates, 401(k) plans alter household savings
incentives on many other dimensions. Importantly, while the match rate varies across
employees, this is the only variation in plan details across employees: there are no
differences in the investment opportunities, matching caps, tax deductibility limits, or
enrollment procedures across Company employees. The maximum contribution rate
that is eligible for a match, the maximum amount of tax deductible contributions, the
assets available in the plan, the form of the match (Company stock), and the rules and
restrictions governing loans and rebalancing are identical across all employees. For this
reason, the Company uses the same core summary plan description for all employees.
The restricted dimensionality of plan benefits within the Company reduces effects that
omitted variables and jointly varying plan benefits could have when interpreting
estimates of the effects of the match rate or marginal tax rate on savings behavior.
As the match rates vary within the Company, the general SPD states only that matching
programs may be available. The SPD then explains the maximum percentage of salary
that the Company will match, the form of the matching (Company stock), and the
vesting rules for the matching funds. The employee's local human resources
representatives then distribute a supplement to the SPD with information on that
particular employee's match rate.
In the Company, match rates vary across four dimensions: the city and state of the
workplace, whether or not the employee is hourly or salaried, the employee's
subsidiary, and, amongst hourly employees, the employee's union status. Retirement
benefits are selected by division heads with the requirement that the division report a
given rate of return. Two salaried employees who work for the same subsidiary within
the Company in neighboring cities may receive two different match rates. In practice,
roughly one third of the states in the sample have within-state variation in the match
rate offered to employees. In this sample, there is no within-employee variation in the
offered match rates over time.3 To be clear, it is often the case that different subsidiaries
are the result of historical acquisition behavior by the firm. To the extent that the
current employees in an acquired firm are similar to the employees at acquisition, the
variation in match rates may be seen as across multiple firms, rather than within a
single firm. That said, such a claim ignores the fact that all of the other savings plan
details are identical across employees, and as such the variation in the match is free
from several sources of confounding variation unlike a common across firm
identification strategy.
1.5 Calculating Individual Marginal Tax Rates
The data contains employee observations across 38 different states for the years 2003-
2006. As in Milligan (2002), Cunningham and Englehardt (2002) and Long (1990), the
variation in marginal tax rates is across states and years. There are changes in the
federal tax code during this time (largely relating to the income ranges within a given
tax bracket), but the bulk of the variation in marginal tax rates is across states at a point
in time.
The Company data provides a limited snapshot of total household labor earnings and
capital income each year. The data informs the household's marital status based on
their insurance elections, but provides no information on spousal or capital income. To
obtain a more complete picture of household earnings, households are matched with
3 It is not clear that variation within an employee over time is especially helpful as there is much inertia in
retirement savings behavior. See Laibson, Madrian, Shea (2001).
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similar households in the Current Population Survey ("CPS") and household capital
and spousal income in the Company data are inferred from the CPS sample.
Households in the Company data are organized according to their marital status, age
and income decile, number of children, race, full time status, salaried status, state, year,
and gender. These categories are matched to similarly constructed categories in the
CPS. Individual earnings reported from the Company's W2 data are then scaled up by
the relevant category-multiplier in the CPS to estimate total household labor income
and total household capital income. This process turned individual labor income data
into estimates of total household earnings and income. Once this information is
obtained for the household, marginal tax rates are calculated using the National Bureau
of Economic Research's TAXSIM program.
Table III contains statistics on the variation in match rates and federal and state
marginal tax rates within and across states. Ten percent of the sample is offered a 50%
match rate (3,377 observations), though this ten percent is distributed over 25 of the 38
states in the sample. Of those 25 states, 15 have a significant fraction (greater than 5%)
of the employees assigned to a 50% matching plan. Those fifteen states contain 13,265
of the 39,331 employee-year observations (34% of the total). Much of the variation in
marginal tax rates is due to differences in state income tax codes. On average, state tax
rates average around 20-25% of the federal rates, though seven states have an average
state marginal tax rate of zero. The seven states with no state income taxes contain
8,448 observations (21.4% of the total). The largest states in the sample are Pennsylvania
(5,930 employee year observations), Texas (4,954), Indiana (3,739), Michigan (3,526), and
Virginia (3,032).
Participation Rates and Contribution Rates
There are two main outcomes of interest in this paper: the employee participation rate
in the 401(k) plan; and second, the employee's own-money contribution rate to the plan.
The employee is defined as "participating" in the plan if they have positive own-money
contributions in a given year. The employee's contribution rate is defined as the ratio of
an employee's own-money contributions to their annual income for that year. 4
The distinction between the extensive (participation rate) and intensive (contribution
rate) margins is quite important. Increasing the match rates increases the value of
marginal contributions to the plan which will act to increase savings through the
substitution effect, but increases in the match rate also increase the present value of the
agent's consumption, which will act to decrease savings through the income effect. For
example, an increase in plan benefits may induce individuals who were previously not
participating to begin contributions to the plan, but conditional on participation, the
income effect of an increase in the match may dominate and conditional contributions
may decrease. 5
As noted in Table II, roughly 87% of employees within the Company contribute to the
plan during any given year. Mean and median contribution rates conditional on
participation lie between 6% and 7% of wage income, which corresponds to the
matching cap of 6% put in place by the Company.
4 Without a restriction to own money contributions, there is a mechanical positive relationship between
total contribution rates and match rates.
s Note that for individuals who contribute beyond the matching cap of 6% of annual income, any increase
in match rates should unambiguously lead to a decrease in savings as there is no substitution effect at the
margin.
1.6
Baseline Specification
I estimate several specifications: first, a simple model with no covariate controls;
second, I incorporate flexible controls for ages, wages, tenure, and other demographic
characteristics in the data; and finally, an instrumental variables approach to
accommodate the endogeneity of individual marginal tax rates.
Specifications are of the following form:
4. yist = xist f + St + ys + Eist
Where yist denotes either: a dummy variable that equals one if employee i contributed
to the 401(k) plan in state s in year t, or employee i's contribution rate in state s in year
t. The match rates and/or marginal tax rates are denoted by the xist, St are year fixed
effects, ys are state fixed effects (where indicated), and Eist is the individual level
innovation term.
The specifications in this paper can be thought of as a reduced form interpretation of
the effect of match rates and marginal tax rates on retirement savings behavior. An
alternative estimation strategy is a maximum likelihood estimation with non-linear
budget set analysis. This involves constructing the intertemporal budget constraint for
each household with each segment determined based on household contributions
relative to the matching cap and their marginal tax rate, and then estimating the
likelihood of a given household consuming on each segment of the budget set as a
function of plan parameters, as in Hausman (1985). This approach is often applied to
labor force participation as in Blomquist and Newey (1999). In this context, I prefer the
reduced form methodology for two reasons: the resulting coefficients are the relevant
values for policy interventions involving the parameters of interest, and the bulk of the
existing literature on the effects of the match rate on retirement savings employs a
similar reduced form approach. That said, estimation with non-linear budget sets is a
valid alternative that is beyond the scope of this paper.
1.7
1.8 Simulated Instruments and Identification
Individual marginal tax rates cannot be used to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect
of tax benefits on participation and contribution rates. Not only are individual marginal
tax rates influenced by individual characteristics that are correlated with savings
behavior, they also reflect state-specific variation in earnings. This endogeneity is dealt
with through a simulated instruments approach that is similar to Currie and Gruber
(1997). For each year, a national sample is run through the tax code for each state. The
marginal tax rates faced by each household are calculated under the rules for that state.
The resulting rates are then averaged by state and year. This state-year average is the
instrument for individuals who reside in that state-year pair. This process purges the
marginal tax rate measure of potentially confounding individual information that may
bias the estimated coefficients, as well as any state-specific distributional concerns as
the instrument is based on the marginal tax rates faced by a national sample under the
rules of each state. The resulting simulated instrument varies only through the
variation in tax laws between states over time: all individual level variation has been
removed.
After the simulated instruments process, the identification of the marginal tax rate
coefficient is solely at the state and year level. The exclusion restriction in these
specifications is that the general level of tax rates in a particular state and year do not
impact employee 401(k) savings, except through their effects on the tax deductibility
and tax free compounding of those contributions. This restriction requires no income
effects from taxation. For example, increases in the level of tax rates in a given state can
decrease net household wages, which can decrease current and future consumption
levels. If such changes in consumption levels over time due to changes in tax rates and
tax policy lead to changes in household savings behavior, the tax rates resulting from
the simulated instruments procedure may still fail to identify the desired effects.
Identification of the effect of match rates on savings behavior in equation (4) relies on
the exogenous assignment of match rates within the Company. Again, match rates are
chosen for participating employees by division heads, and the unit of variation for
match rate assignment in the sample of interest is the location-subsidiary pair. The
identification strategy for the effect of the match rates will fail if match rates were
historically assigned because of persistent differences in preferences for retirement
savings amongst different groups of employees that happen(ed) to separate on location-
subsidiary pairs. While the exclusion restriction is not directly testable, it is possible to
compare the observable characteristics of employees across match rates. Recall the
summary statistics in Table I. The employees with a 100% match rate appear to have
higher wages, and appear to have worked slightly longer for the Company. I attempt to
accommodate for these differences with flexible non-linear income and tenure controls
in various specifications. Again, the 401(k) plan details across employees are identical
except for the match rates: at best, match rates are exogenously assigned within the
firm, while at worst, match rates vary across subsidiaries such that the identifying
variation for match rates is across firms with otherwise identical retirement savings
plans.
Match rates do not vary within employees in this data unless the employee has either
left the sample entirely, or otherwise changed their location-subsidiary pair that
determines individual match rates. It is straightforward to identify the effect of
marginal tax rates on retirement savings by exploiting the variation in tax rules across
both states and years, but the variation in match rates is largely across employees
(states) at point in time. The variation in the match rate within states over time is due to
the entry, transfer, and exit of employees, which may be substantively different than the
variation in match rates across employees (states) at a point in time. To address this
issue, I estimate the effect of match rates on retirement savings behavior using the
variation across states at a point in time with year fixed effects alone, and the impact of
marginal tax rates is estimated separately with both state and year fixed effects. I also
include a specification that simultaneously estimates the effects of match rates and
marginal tax rates using both state and year controls.6
1.9 Participation Rates
Again, the estimation equation is of the following form:
4. Yist = Xist f + St + Ys + Eist
Where yist is a binary variable equal to one if the employee contributed to the 401(k)
plan during the year, xist denotes the match rates and/or marginal tax rates, St are year
fixed effects, ys are state fixed effects (where indicated), and Eist is the individual level
error term. Standard errors are clustered at the state level for all specifications. These
specifications are Column I and Column III in Table IV.7
The second specification can be expressed as follows:
5. Yist = Xist f + Zist C + 5 t + Ys + Eist
Where all variables are defined as in equation (4), and zist are flexible covariate controls.
These include: dummies indicating the employee's decile of the distribution of age and
tenure, dummies for the employee's ethnicity, gender, pension availability, marital
6 If preferences for retirement savings vary systematically across states, then the specification with both
state and year dummies will provide consistent estimates of the effect of marginal tax rates, while the
specification with only year fixed effects will not. Similarly, if the residual within state variation in the
match rate is from employees systematically moving between locations due to variation in their
retirement savings preferences, then the specification that does not include state fixed effects will remain
consistent, while the specification with both state and year controls will not.
7 1 also estimate a Probit model for participation (see Table IV.2). The marginal effects from Probit
estimation are statistically indistinguishable to those in the OLS specification. Contribution rates are
estimated conditional on participation.
status, as well as a five knot cubic spline in labor income. Flexible controls for age,
tenure, and wages are important given their effects on retirement savings decisions and
the possible differences in the sample across match rates as seen in Table I: several
different functional forms were tested with no substantive change in the estimated
coefficients. This estimation can be found as Columns II and Column IV in Table IV.
Coefficients on selected covariates are reported in Table IV.2.
Finally, I estimate the effect of marginal tax rates on participation by incorporating the
instrumental variables strategy discussed in the previous section to account for
endogeneity in individual tax rates.
6. yist = X2st f + zist a + St + ys + Eist
This specification uses a simulated instrument approach, as previously discussed, to
calculate the effect of marginal tax rates ( - ). This specification can be found in Column
V and Column VI in Table IV. In Column VI, the effect of the match and marginal tax
rates are estimated simultaneously.
The estimated coefficients for the effect of the match rate are stable and statistically
indistinguishable across specifications with and without state fixed effects and with and
without the simultaneous inclusion of marginal tax rates (0.00073 without state fixed
effects and without marginal tax rates in Column II, 0.00754 without state fixed effects
and with marginal tax rates in Column VI, and 0.00066 with state fixed effects and with
marginal tax rates in Column VII). This suggests that the residual variation in match
rates within states over time is substantively similar to the variation across states at a
point in time, despite the possible differences in the identifying variation. That said, the
institutional details regarding match rate assignment across employees in the Company
are such that the natural source of variation in match rates is across locations at a point
in time. Given this fact, the preferred specification identifies the effect of the match
without state fixed effects (Column II and Column VI). The point estimates from
Column II will be used in the remainder of this paper, though the ultimate wealth
calculations change very little if the simultaneously estimated coefficients that include
both state and year fixed effects (Column VII) are used instead.
The estimated effects of marginal tax rates are larger in absolute value than the
estimated effects of the match rate. In Column VII of Table IV, a 10 percentage point
increase in marginal tax rates increases participation rates by about 11 percentage
points (13.5% of the mean participation rate), and a corresponding 10 percentage point
increase in the match rate increases participation rates by 0.6 percentage points (0.7% of
the mean). Effects of this magnitude are comparable with the estimated effects of
marginal tax rates in Milligan (2002), where a 10 percentage point increase in marginal
tax rates increases participation rates in Canadian Tax Deferred Accounts by 8%. The
estimated impact of match rates on employee participation (0.73 percentage point
increase in participation with a ten percentage point increase in the match rate) is also
broadly consistent with the estimates in the existing literature as well. In Papke and
Poterba (1995), a change from a 50 percent match rate to 100 percent match rate is
associated with an increase in participation rates of 4.8 percentage points (0.96
percentage points for a ten percentage point change). In Papke (1995), a change in the
match rate from 50 to 100 percent corresponds to a 7.3 percentage points increase (1.46
percentage points in for a ten percentage point change). The effect of a one percentage
point change in marginal tax rates on participation is over ten times larger than the
effect of a similar change in match rates. The difference between the two coefficients is
statistically significant at any reasonable level of confidence. The coefficients on
marginal tax rates do not change if they are estimated simultaneously with the effects of
match rates. However, the absence of state fixed effects substantively alters the
estimated coefficient on marginal tax rates (Column VI versus Column VII of Table IV).
This suggests that the specifications without state fixed effects yield biased estimates for
the effects of marginal tax rates. 8 Given this fact, the preferred specifications for the
effect of marginal tax rates are the instrumental variables specifications that include
state fixed effects (Column V and Column VII). The point estimates from Column V
will be used later in the paper to determine the effects of changes in marginal tax rates
on wealth at retirement. These calculations change very little if the coefficient that is
simultaneously estimated with match rates from Column VII is used instead.
The coefficients on selected covariate controls for the above specifications are presented
in Table IV.2. Contribution rates increase with tenure and income, and white, married
households appear more likely to participate in employer sponsored 401(k) plans. 9
1.10 Contribution Rates
The next issue of interest is to quantify changes employee contribution rates
corresponding to changes in match rates and tax rates. In this section, I replace the
binary measure of contribution behavior used in the participation rate specifications
with the employee's annual contribution rate, measured as the ratio of own-money
contributions to the 401(k) plan to annual employee wages as listed on their W2 forms.
I estimate equations (4), (5), and (6) using the employee's annual contribution rate as the
outcome variable of interest. Specifications estimating the effect of the match rate
and/or marginal tax rates on employee contribution rates are estimated on the
subsample of 34,218 participating employees. These specifications are included in
Table V.
8 This is consistent with differences across states in preferences for savings that is correlated with the
marginal tax rates in the states, such as alternative state programs designed to encourage savings. The
relevance of state fixed effects in tax rate specifications is well documented.
9 Tenure and age are highly correlated. The net impact of a change in tenure category and the
corresponding mean change in age decile is positive.
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The estimated effects of the match rate on contribution rates conditional on
participation are negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero in every
specification (-0.000011 in Column II of Table V, -0.000020 in Column VI of Table V, and
-0.000016 in Column VII of Table V). These results are consistent with small,
insignificant (and often negative) effects of intensive margin increases in match rates on
contribution behavior documented in Papke (1995) and Papke and Poterba (1995).
Column V, Column VI, and Column VII show the estimated effects of marginal tax rates
on contributions are positive and significant. Once again, the instrumental variables
specifications with state fixed effects result in statistically identical point estimates if
estimated individually or estimated simultaneously with the effects of the match rate
(Column V and Column VII). The marginal tax rate coefficients in Column V and
Column VII suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in marginal tax rates increases
contribution rates by 1.5 percentage points (21% of the mean contribution rate of 7%).
While there are no directly comparable estimates in the literature, Cunningham and
Englehardt (2002) find that the introduction of tax deductibility into retirement savings
accounts increases contribution rates by 6 percentage points. In this dataset, the
analogous calculation would be a 24.16 percentage point increase in marginal tax rates
(the average combined federal and state tax rate in the data), which corresponds to an
estimated 3.69 percentage point increase in contribution rates. The inclusion of
covariate controls in Columns II, IV, V, and VII slightly decrease the effects of marginal
tax rates and match rates. In particular, the coefficients on marginal tax rates are
particularly sensitive to the inclusion of information on age and income. 10
For the wealth effects that follow, I use the estimated effects of match rates identified
across states in Column II of Table IV and Table V for reasons discussed at the outset.
However, these calculations change little instead the jointly estimated effects with both
state and year fixed effects from Column VII are used. For marginal tax rate
10 Given that marginal tax rates are an explicit function of income, changes in the marginal tax rate
coefficient with the inclusion of income controls is to be expected.
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calculations, the effects of marginal tax rates on savings behavior identified within
states in Column V of Table IV and V is preferred. Using the specification that includes
match rates and both state and year fixed effects (in Column VII) does not substantively
change the marginal tax rate calculations that follow.
1.11 Comparing the Effects of Match Rates and
Marginal Tax Rates on Savings
One explanation for the differences in sign, significance, and magnitude between the
estimated effects of marginal tax rates and match rates is the relevance of income
effects. Half of the sample contributes beyond the matching cap. For these employees,
further increases in match rates have no substitution effect. Given this fact, it seems
more likely that the income effect of changes in the match will dominate the
substitution effect (and thus equation (6) will yield a negative point estimate for the
effect of match rate). In contrast, essentially every employee in the sample is exposed to
tax deductibility at the margin, so the substitution effect remains relevant for many
more individuals. 11
Another explanation for the different effects of match rates and marginal tax rates can
be in the form of the incentives themselves. As discussed at the outset, the benefits to
the employee from matching contributions and tax deductibility are substantially
different. Employer matching contributions are made in Company stock, which cannot
be divested for a period of two years, whereas the benefits from tax deductibility are
realized in cash. With this view, the coefficient on match rates is an underestimate (in
absolute value) of the true effect of matching contributions when measured in the same
assets as the effects of tax benefits. Indeed, Muelbrook (2002) estimates the value of a
match in Company stock versus a match paid in cash at roughly fifty cents on the
1 There are 42 employee-year observations out of 34,218 that contribute beyond the tax deductibility cap.
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dollar, but any such calculation is complicated by the revealed preference of the
employees in the sample: recall from Table I that roughly 46% of employees contribute
some of their own savings to the Company's common stock above and beyond the
automatic matching contributions. For these individuals, any such correction is
inappropriate. 12
Despite this, some adjustment is necessary to properly compare the effects of marginal
tax rates and match rates. The benefits of tax deductibility and tax free compounding
on retirement wealth increase over time, as they largely manifest through increases in
the annualized rate of return. Changes in the match rate have fairly flat effects on
retirement wealth over time, while the effect that the match rate has on the internal rate
of return on 401(k) contributions relative to savings outside of the 401(k) plan increases
over time: eventually, employees can contribute to the account, recover the matching
contribution, and immediately withdraw their original funds and the matching
contributions. 13
A one percentage point increase in tax rates has a different impact on the relative value
of the 401(k) savings plan than a one percentage point change in the match rate, and
these effects change over time. To better compare the estimates in Table IV and Table
V, I calculate the effect of a one percentage point change in match rates and marginal
tax rates on the spread between the annualized internal rate of return of contributions to
the Company sponsored 401(k) plan and an external savings vehicle with neither tax
advantages, nor matching contributions for a variety of parameterizations for age, real
interest rates, and marginal tax rates. I use the point estimates from Table IV and Table
V along with equation (3) to calculate the change in this 401(k) "spread" through
changes in either the marginal tax rate or the match rate for these parameterizations. I
calculate:
12 The estimates in Muelbrook are especially difficult to reconcile with individual behavior given the
findings in Benartzi (2001) that own-money contributions to company stock tend to increase when
employer matching contributions are made in company stock relative to cash.
13 Even employees that are eligible to immediately withdraw matching contributions have less than 100%
participation rates. See Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2005).
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The results of these calculations for match rates are included in Table VI and results for
marginal tax rates are included in Table VII. Entries in the table represent the effect of a
10 percentage point increase in the match rate and the marginal tax rate at the specified
rate of return, age, baseline match rate, and baseline marginal tax rate on the annualized
spread of the 401(k) plan as measured by changes in equation (3).
The annualized spread in Table VI decreases as the baseline match rate increases, and
increases (slightly) as marginal tax rates increase. Increases in the match rate are more
valuable in terms of changes in the annualized spread when the initial match rate is
low. The relatively large impact of the match rate on the annualized spread at low
levels of the match is consistent with estimates from Papke (1995) and Papke and
Poterba (1995) that find increases in the match rate when the match is near zero have
much larger effects on savings and participation rates than increases in the match when
the match is near one. The value of changes in the match rate increases with age, and
the rate of return on investment has no impact on the value of changes in the match,
unless the employee is also receiving tax benefits. The change in the annualized spread
due to changes in marginal tax rates (Table VII) increases with increases in both the
baseline match rate and the baseline marginal tax rate. Increases in the spread due to
increases in marginal tax rates are higher when the match rate and the marginal tax rate
are already high. As the benefits from tax deductibility accrue over time through tax
free compounding, the gains due to changes in the marginal tax rates decrease with age
and increase with the rate of return on investment. At the mean values of age and
marginal tax rate in the sample (45 years and 25%, respectively) and an annual rate of
return on investment of 3 percent, a change in the match rate is slightly more valuable
(in terms of the annualized 401(k) spread) than the change in tax rates for employees
with a 50% match (0.0342% for the match versus 0.0302% for the tax rate), while the
situation is reversed for employees with 100% match rates (0.0260% and 0.0306%).14
The point estimates in Table IV and V can be applied to these values to see the response
of 401(k) participation and savings rates to changes in the rates of return induced by
changes in marginal tax rates and match rates. In Column II of Table IV, we found that
a one percentage point increase in the match rate led to a 0.073 percentage point
increase in participation rates, while a one percentage point increase in the marginal tax
rate from Column V of Table IV led to a 1.43 percentage point increase in participation
rates. For employees with a 100% match rate, the one percentage point increase in the
match is a 0.0260 percentage point increase in the annualized spread of the 401(k) plan,
and a one percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate is a 0.0306 percentage point
increase in the value of the 401(k) plan. Combining these values, the change in
participation rates per basis point of change in value of the 401(k) plan due to changes
in the match rate is 2.81 for employees with 100% match rates (SE: 1.10); while the
change in participation rate per basis point of change in value due to changes in the
marginal tax rate is 50.72 (SE: 6.17). Employees seem much more responsive to changes
in the marginal tax rate than to changes in the match rates, even when the two
incentives are translated into the implied impact on the relative value of the 401(k) plan.
In Column II of Table V, the change in contribution rates conditional on participation
due to changes in the match rate is -0.0011 percentage points, while the change in
contribution due to changes in the marginal tax rate from Column V of Table V is 0.154
percentage points. Again, the effects of the match rate and marginal tax rate on
annualized rate of return at the mean values of age and tax rates in the sample are
0.0260% and 0.0306% for match rates and marginal tax rates respectively. This implies
that the change in contribution rates per basis point change in value of the 401(k) plan
due to changes in the match rate is -0.0423 (SE: 0.196), while the change in contribution
14 With an annualized rate of return of 7 percent, the value of changes in the marginal tax rate is greater
than the value of changes in the match rate for employees receiving 50% or 100% match rates.
rates per basis point change in value due to changes in the tax rate is 5.04 (SE: 0.546),
over one hundred times larger in absolute value. Together, these calculations suggest
that after adjusting match rates and marginal tax rates for their impact on the relative
value of the 401(k) plan, employee participation and contribution behavior is still more
responsive to changes in the marginal tax rate than to changes in the match rate.
1.12 Effects on Wealth at Retirement
The effects of match rates and marginal tax rates on the relative value of the 401(k) plan
through annualized rates of return differ substantially. Often, the relevant outcome for
policy intervention is the effects of changes in the match or in tax rates on the
employee's total accumulated wealth at retirement. This calculation requires the
estimated effects on participation and contribution rates simultaneously.
An employee's total wealth at retirement if they do not have access to matching
benefits, tax deductibility, or tax free compounding can be expressed through the
following relationship:
7. WT = (1 - Tret )IcsHJ s[1+ r(1-T)]]
Where T5 is the employee's marginal tax rate at time s, Tret is the marginal tax rate at
retirement, cs is the employee's contributions at time s (in after-tax dollars), and r is the
annualized interested rate earned on the portfolio at time s. The presence of matching
contributions and tax benefits change the relationship to:
8. WT = (1 - Tret)S= [ s(1+ms)HJ=s[1+ r]
Where ms is the match rate offered to the employee at time s, and all of the other
variables are defined as before.
Changes in wealth at retirement due to changes in plan parameters occur through two
separate channels: first, there is the mechanical effect on WT (the partial derivative of
the expression above); second, changes in plan parameters impact the size of an
employee's contributions, c, (and the associated partial derivative above). 15 That is,
changes in retirement wealth can be decomposed into:
9. d WT= _ w +aWT a~C5
dx, ax, acs axs
Where x, is the parameter of interest (m, or r,). Of the three expressions on the right
side of the equality, the non-mechanical relationship is , which was estimated in the
previous section. This decomposition allows for the evaluation of changes in match
rates and marginal tax rates in terms of their effects on wealth at retirement for various
households.
1.13 Changes in Wealth at Retirement: Matching
Contributions
In the last decade, there has been much debate about ways to increase retirement
savings amongst low and middle income families (Duflo, Gale, et al 2005). One of the
most common suggestions is to "match" retirement contributions to IRA and 401(k)
accounts via federal tax credits, or the creation of separate retirement savings accounts,
or "RSAs" that incorporate this sort of matching scheme. 16 The point estimates in this
15 Note: the empirical estimates in the previous section and the existing literature suggest that D differs ifax,
c, = 0 or if c, > 0. If c, = 0, the relevant value is the effect on participation, and if c, > 0, the desired
estimate is the effect on contributions conditional on participation.
16 The June 2, 2009 version of the federal budget of the United States of America includes provisions that
dramatically expand the current "Saver's Credit" through refundability of existing tax credits and an
increase in the income thresholds. These changes collectively make the program look behave much like a
matching scheme for many more households.
paper allow us to calculate the effect that such proposals will have on wealth at
retirement.
For example, consider the introduction of a federal match rate of 50% on retirement
savings. Such a policy will have three effects on retirement wealth: the match rate will
mechanically increase the wealth of future retirees by up to 50%; the presence of the
match will alter the number of people who participate in the savings accounts; and the
presence of the match will alter the contribution rates of individuals who participate in
these accounts. Equations (7) and (8) can be used to calculate these changes. From
equation (8):
10WT = (1 - Tret) cs =S+r ]], and
11. = (1 - Tret) 1(1 + ms) fj=[1 + r]
And from our point estimates in Column II of Table IV and Table V, we have:
= -0.000011I, for cS > 0ams
O(1{c5 > 0})
= 0.000733
ams
For changes in conditional contribution rates and participation rates respectively (with
I. representing wage income at time s). Given a path for real interest rates, income, and
tax rates for the household, it is possible to calculate the changes in wealth at retirement
due to existing matching contributions and tax advantages, and due to the incremental
changes in wealth through the increase in match rates as discussed above.
Baseline Benefits + Change in Benefits =
dWr'M
WT Pr(cs > 0) + din Pr(cs > ms) =
WT eO WT
Cs>0
Es c(1 + MS) j 1 + rs +cs)H s[1 + r] Ams
T _[c H7 [1 + r - r)]]
This calculation is done in Panel I of Table VIII. 17
Several patterns emerge. First, the increases in wealth at retirement due to the
introduction of general matching increase as the age of the household decreases, as the
rate of return on investment increases, and as the marginal tax rate increases. The
increases with age are particularly pronounced: both the existing effects of the marginal
tax rate (Panel II) and the incremental effects of changes in the match rate (Panel III)
increase for younger households. This suggests that the effectiveness of matching -type
savings incentives is dependent on the length of time the benefits can be realized by the
household, as well as the realized values of interest rates. Second, the incremental
benefits due to changes in the match rate (Panel III) are between one-quarter and one-
third of the total change in wealth, depending on the age of the household. This is
primarily due to the mechanical effect of the matching funds, as the induced effect of
the match rate on contributions (Panel IV) only represents a small fraction of the gains
in total wealth. Six to eight percent of the incremental changes in wealth (two to five
percent of the total changes in wealth) at retirement are due to induced changes in
contribution and participation rates resulting from the increase in match rates.
Introducing or increasing match rates increases wealth at retirement primarily through
the functional relationship between match rates and future wealth, rather than through
changes in household savings behavior.
17 Note that has two values based on the value of c, with and without the plan: If c, is positive with
0 ms
and without the change, -0.0000 114; if c, is positive with the change and zero without the change,
ac,=0.000733-, where-c- is the average contribution amount amongst plan participants.
m
Obviously, if c~, is zero in either case, acs -0.
am
1.14 Changes in Wealth at Retirement: Marginal Tax
Rates
While raising taxes is not a policy designed to encourage savings, the effect of changes
in marginal tax rates on savings behavior within retirement and other tax advantaged
accounts is of interest. This is especially true at the present, as there are likely to be
revisions to the federal tax code in the coming years.18 The estimates in Table IV and
Table V allow for the calculation of the effect of tax changes on wealth at retirement
through an expansion as in equation (9).
The mechanical effect that an increase in marginal tax rates will have on retirement
wealth can be seen in equation (8):
12. aWT= (1 - Tret ) 1 cS(1 + mS)I[=s[1 + r]
Again, is defined by equation (11). From the point estimates in Column V of Table
IV and Table V:
Ocs
-= 0.00154Is for cs > 0
O(1{c5 > 0)
= 0.0143
as
Table IX contains the impacts on wealth at retirement of increasing tax rates.
The cells contain calculations for the baseline effect of the savings plan through
matching and tax deferred growth, as well as the incremental changes in wealth in the
tax-advantaged account due to an increase in tax rates of 3 percentage points. As
before, the changes in wealth are benchmarked against the wealth that the employee
18 Current proposed revisions include: rolling back tax credits enacted in 2001, tax surcharges to fund
health care expansion, increases in taxes to fund intervention in financial markets, and so on.
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could otherwise accumulate outside of the account. Total changes in wealth (in Panel I)
are defined as:
Baseline Benefits + Change in Benefits =
dWTA
- Pr(c, > 0) + d Pr(c, > 0|lAm,) =
WT c>O WT
c'>o
sET (_ycs(1 + ms) ri '[1 + r]] + [( C + ac 1+ mS) f 1 +r ArS
S= 1 c 5 (1+ - aS1 i
S=o[cS H [1 + r (1 -0y)
Where 2 again has two values based on the sign of cs with and without the
incremental policy intervention as depicted above.
Young households receive the preponderance of the benefits from changes in marginal
tax rates, though the age-benefits profile here is much less pronounced than it was for
changes in the match rates. The extra wealth at retirement due to additional
contributions induced by tax changes is roughly half of the total additional wealth at
retirement from the tax increase (Panel IV/Panel III) across the various values for
household age and rate of return, compared to 6 to 8 percent for match rates. Changes
in marginal tax rates alter wealth at retirement in large part due to the effects of the
changes on savings behavior, while changes in match rates appear to impact wealth at
retirement primarily through the mechanical effect of the match on wealth. This is
consistent with the empirical results in the previous section that illustrate the effect of
tax rates on contribution and participation behavior is much larger than that of match
rates.
Conclusion
This paper utilized a unique dataset from a Fortune 500 corporation in the United States
to compare the effectiveness of tax benefits and matching contributions as savings
incentives. The only variation in plan details amongst participating employees within
the firm is the match rate that they are offered. Vesting requirements, available assets,
matching caps, loan provisions, and the logistics of account management are identical
across all employees. This variation allows for identification of the effects of match
rates on participation and contribution rates. The data spanned several states and
years, which allowed for identification of the effects of tax rates through a simulated
instruments approach as in Currie and Gruber (1997).
The estimated effects of increases in matching contribution on participation and savings
behavior are consistent with existing literature: increases in the match rate on the
intensive margin lead to small increases in participation rate, and small (statistically
insignificant) decreases in participation rate (Papke (1995); Papke and Poterba (1995);
Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1994)). The estimates for the effects of the tax rate are
without direct comparison, though the sign and magnitude of the effects on
participation rates are consistent with point estimates of the effects of taxation in other
contexts (Long (1990); Milligan (2002); Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002)). Marginal
tax rates have large, significant effects on employee participation and contribution
behavior in 401(k) plans. These results are robust to joint and individual estimation, as
well as a flexible array of controls and covariates.
The empirical estimates are translated into implied changes in the internal rate of return
that a 401(k) plan offers the employee. For a given change in the annualized rate of
return, match rates and marginal tax rates have substantially different effects on
participation and contribution behavior. The difference between changes in tax rates
and match rates on savings are particularly striking in this light: when measured in
terms of changes to the internal rate of return of the 401(k) plan, employees are over
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1.15
fifteen times more responsive to variation in the marginal tax rate compared to
variation in the match rate on the participation margin. The difference on the
contribution margin is even larger.
Finally, the estimates are used to evaluate the effects of changes in match rates and
marginal tax rates on wealth at retirement within 401(k) accounts: the introduction of a
general "top up" matching scheme with a 50% match rate, and a fixed three percentage
point increase in tax rates. These calculations accommodate endogenous changes in
participation rates and contribution rates as plan parameters change according to the
estimates in the paper. The change in match rates leads to an increase in participation
rates, small decreases in contribution rates conditional on participation, and an increase
in the relative value of the retirement account. Much of the effects due to changes in
match rates are due to the matching funds themselves, with little additional wealth
from induced participation and contribution behavior by households. In contrast, the
tax increase leads to an increase in the relative value of the retirement plan through an
increase in both participation and savings rates. Nearly half of the additional wealth at
retirement under the tax simulation is due to increases in contribution and participation
rates rather than the mechanical value of the subsidy.
Future areas for research on this topic include explanations why these two incentives
have such different impacts on savings behavior. Behavioral effects, such as time
inconsistent preferences as in Benartzi and Thaler (2004); Laibson (1998); Diamond and
Koszegi (2000), and/or errors in household optimization as in Duflo and Saez (2002);
Benartzi (2001); Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002) may help account for some
of these differences. In addition to explanations into why the differences in behavior
occur, there are alternative ways to estimate the effects of match rates and marginal tax
rates on savings. There is little in the existing literature on the effects of match rates on
savings similar to the non-linear budget sets analysis seen in the literature on labor
force participation and taxation. The effects of match rates and marginal tax rates on
retirement savings behavior seem like a natural application of the non-linear budget
sets approach.
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Tables
Table 1: Relative Effects of Tax and Matching Benefits in 401(k) Accounts
Annual Interest
Rate 0.03
10 1.04
20 1.09
30 1.14
40 1.19
Annual Interest 0.03
Rate
Tax Benefits Alone
0.05 0.07
1.07 1.10
1.15 1.22
1.24 1.34
1.33 1.48
Tax Benefits Alone
0.05 0.07
m=0.5, t=Tret=0.15
Total Benefits
0.10 0.03 0.05 0.07
1.15 1.57 1.61 1.66
1.32 1.64 1.73 1.83
1.51 1.71 1.86 2.02
1.73 1.79 2.00 2.23
m=0.5, T--Tret=0.25
Total Benefits
0.10 0.03 0.05 0.07
1.61
1.74
1.87
2.01
1.77
2.09
2.46
2.90
m=0.5, T=Tret=0.35
Annual Interest
Rate 0.03
10 1.11
20 1.23
30 1.36
40 1.51
Tax Benefits Alone
0.05 0.07
1.18 1.26
1.40 1.59
1.66 2.00
1.96 2.53
Total Benefits
0.10 0.03 0.05 0.07
1.38 1.66 1.77 1.89
1.91 1.84 2.10 2.38
2.64 2.04 2.48 3.01
3.65 2.26 2.94 3.79
o
~0
0)4
0.10
2.07
2.86
3.96
5.47
Source: Author's Calculations
Cells contain the relative value of a dollar invested in a 401(k) account to a dollar invested outside of the
account at withdrawal for the specified match rates, marginal tax rates, interest rates, and years to
withdrawal.
Tables
Match Rate
Count
Percent Male
Percent Married
50
3377
Panel A: Demographics
0.741
0.722
Percent with Pension Plan*
Average Tenure*
Average Age
Median Income*
Mean Marginal Tax Rate*
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics by Match Rate
100 Match Rate
35954 Count
0.673
0.729
0.917 0.9002
12.09
45.17
15.17
45.67
41608 60939
21.38 24.42
Full Sample of 39,331 observations
Percent Male
Average Age
Average Tenure
Median Income
0.678
45.627
14.9
59580
Percent Contributing
Mean Own Contribution
Mean Own Contribution
Percentage
Mean Conditional Own
Contribution Percentage
Percent Contributing to
Company Stock
Percent who Contribute
beyond Matching Cap
50
3377
Panel B: Outcomes
0.791
3467.09
0.0554
0.0689 0.0719
0.461
0.569
EBRI Data^
Percent Male
Average Age
Average Tenure
Median Income
100
35954
0.877
4345.62
0.0634
0.452
0.615
0.524
39.5
6.7
35136
Participation Rate 0.869 Participation Rate 0.849
All Statistics from 2003-2006 pooled sample.
* Demographic Characteristics are statistically different at a 95% level of confidence.
^ Source: EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, Chapter 10, table 10.9 (2003) and BLS Occupational Employment Statistics
(2005)
Tables
Table III: Summary Statistics on Marginal Tax Rates and Match Rates by State
State Average Federal Standard Deviation of Average State Standard Deviation of Both Match Rates > 5 % offered 50 %Marginal Tax Rate Federal Rates Marginal Tax Rate State Tax Rates Offered in State Match in State Total Count
AR 19.43 5.33 7.12 0.16 Y N 275
AZ 18.63 7.12 3.31 0.70 Y Y 981
CA 20.51 6.32 6.79 2.79 Y Y 866
CO 27.02 3.50 4.63 0.00 Y Y 3
CT 20.06 6.11 4.34 0.88 Y Y 204
DE 25.00 0.00 5.95 0.00 N N 4
FL 19.87 6.01 0.00 0.00 Y Y 311
GA 19.19 6.56 5.94 0.50 N N 529
IA 20.20 5.74 6.72 0.60 N N 1,568
IL 21.59 6.59 3.03 0.18 Y Y 1,276
IN 20.16 5.75 3.41 0.13 Y N 3,739
KS 20.06 9.02 5.72 1.63 N N 424
KY 20.35 6.18 5.93 0.10 Y Y 733
LA 17.60 5.78 4.23 0.77 N N 508
MA 19.67 6.12 5.31 0.45 Y Y 56
MD 20.81 5.34 8.22 0.60 Y Y 16
MI 20.05 5.94 3.94 0.07 Y N 3,526
MN 21.93 6.04 7.29 1.47 N N 390
MO 22.12 5.72 5.56 0.52 N N 130
MS 19.02 5.64 4.97 0.16 Y Y 199
NC 19.50 5.47 7.08 0.25 Y Y 312
NH 20.84 6.29 0.00 0.00 N N 50
NJ 20.56 5.75 4.00 1.61 Y N 445
NV 16.25 5.02 0.00 0.00 Y Y 36
NY 21.14 6.15 6.79 0.87 Y Y 1,642
OH 20.12 6.17 5.22 0.66 Y Y 1,676
OR 25.00 0.00 9.00 0.00 N N 8
PA 21.86 6.51 3.27 3.97 Y N 5,930
RI 23.37 6.32 6.33 1.96 N N 22
SC 19.38 5.69 6.95 0.44 N N 1,214
SD 18.75 9.10 0.00 0.00 N N 336
TN 21.90 5.94 0.00 0.00 Y N 2,384
TX 19.00 6.52 0.00 0.00 Y Y 4,954
UT 16.55 7.58 6.62 0.48 Y N 357
VA 21.18 5.77 5.76 0.20 Y N 3,032
VT 25.66 0.37 7.71 0.29 N N 5
WA 21.16 5.99 0.00 0.00 Y N 377
WI 19.58 6.32 7.65 1.32 Y N 813
Source: Author's Calculations with assitance from the National Bureau of Economic Research Taxsim program (Version 8)
*The standard deviation of Pennsylvania's state tax rates is high relative to the mean state tax rate. This is largely due to the gradual tax forgiveness provisions present in
that state. These provisions lead to very high estimated marginal tax rates for individuals on the "kink points" of the tax schedule. See 2006 form PA-40, page 35 for
complete details.
Column
Method
Count
Match Rate
Marginal Tax Rate
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Demographic Controls
Income, Age Controls
Instrument for Marginal
Table IV: Baseline Specifications- Participation Rates
1 Il Ill IV V
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
39,331 39,331 39,331 39,331 39,331
0.00175** 0.000733**
[0.000348] [0.000286]
VI VIl
IV IV
39,331 39,331
0.000754** 0.000661**
[0.000289] [0.000287]
0.00260** 0.00070 0.0143** -0.00108 0.0118**
[0.00051] [0.00053] [0.00174] [0.00217] [0.00171
X X
X
X
X X
X X
X
X
X X
Tax Rates
Coefficients represent the effect of a one-percentage point change in the indicated variable.
Standard Errors in Brackets. Standard Errors are calculated using clustering at the state level.
** Significantly different from zero at 5% confidence. * Different from zero at at 10% confidence.
All Specifications include Year Fixed Effects. Columns Ill-V and VII also include state fixed effects.
Columns I and il are estimated with match rates alone.
Columns Ill, IV, and V are estimated with marginal tax rates alone.
Columns V, VI and VII instrument for marginal tax rates with the simulated instrument value.
When indicated, demographic controls include: dummy variables for gender, marital status, ethnicity, defined benefit
pension availability, and tenure; Income and Age controls include a five-knot cubic spline in income, and age decile fixed
effects.
Tables
Tables
Table IV.2: Baseline Specifications- Participation Rates- Selected Covariates
Column CounVI VI VI VI VII VII
(From Table IV) VI VI VI VI Vil Vil
Method OLS OLS Probit Probit IV IV
Count 39,331 39,331 39,331 39,331 39,331 39,331
Match Rate 0.000727** 0.000603** 0.000569** 0.000431** 0.00075** 0.000661**
10.000284] [0.000258] [0.000194] [0.000155] [0.000289] [0.000287]
Marginal Tax Rate 0.00029 0.00072 0.00017 0.00053 -0.00108 0.0118**
[0.000564] [0.00053] [0.000461] [0.00042] [0.00217] [0.0017]
Age Decile 1 -0.014 -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 -0.014 -0.009
Age Decile 2 -0.033 -0.029** -0.031** -.027** -0.033** -0.025**
Age Decile 3 -0.040** -0.036** -0.039** -.033** -0.041** -0.031**
Age Decile 4 -0.038** -0.035** -0.038** -.034** -0.038** -0.032**
Age Decile 5 -0.051** -0.048** -0.053** -.049** -0.051** -0.044**
Age Decile 6 -0.024 -0.021 -0.017 -0.015 -0.024 -0.015
Age Decile 7 -0.035** -0.030 -0.034** -.029* -0.035** -0.026
Age Decile 8 -0.049** -0.044** -0.052** -.047** -0.049** -0.040**
Age Decile 9 -0.10** -0.098** 0.115** -.110** -0.10** -0.091**
Tenure 6-7 y 0.057** 0.0951** 0.042** 0.0638** 0.058** 0.0928**
Tenure 8 -10y 0.10** 0.108** 0.068** 0.0716** 0.102** 0.104**
Tenure 11-14y 0.12** 0.122** 0.076** 0.0816** 0.116** 0.118**
Tenure 15-17y 0.13** 0.128** 0.084** 0.0841** 0.125** 0.125**
Tenure 18 -2 1y 0.14** 0.131** 0.089** 0.0862** 0.137** 0.128**
Tenure 22-25y 0.14** 0.136** 0.090** 0.0904** 0.138** 0.132**
Tenure 26 -29y 0.14** 0.132** 0.092** 0.0863** 0.140** 0.129**
Tenure 30y+ 0.09** 0.084** 0.09** 0.0604** 0.140** 0.079**
White 0.037** 0.0355** 0.034** 0.033** 0.038** 0.0338**
Married 0.12** 0.0125** 0.009* 0.0092** 0.002 0.090**
Male 0.352** 0.0362** 0.034** 0.0350** 0.036** 0.034**
Defined Benefit Plan FE 0.037 0.045* 0.036* 0.039** 0.035 0.044*
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State Fixed Effects X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
Income, Age Controls X X X X X X
Instrument for Marginal X X
Tax Rates
Coefficients represent the estimated effect of a one-percentage point change in the indicated variable.
Reported Probit coefficients are the estimated marginal effects.
Standard Errors in Brackets.
Standard Errors are calculated using clustering at the state level.
** Significantly different from zero at 5% confidence.
* Significantly different from zero at at 10% confidence.
All Specifications include Year Fixed Effects. State Fixed effects are included where specified.
Specification VII instruments for marginal tax rates with the simulated instrument value.
When indicated, demographic controls include: dummy variables for gender, marital status, ethnicity, defined
benefit pension availability, and tenure; Income and Age controls include a five-knot cubic spline in income, and
age decile fixed effects.
Tables
Table V: Baseline Specifications- Contribution Rates Conditional on Participation
1 II
OLS OLS
34,218 34,218
0.000072* -0.000011
[0.000041] [0.000051]
III IV
OLS OLS
34,218 34,218
V
IV
34,218
VI VII
IV IV
34,218 34,218
-0.00002 -0.000016
[0.00006] [0.000079]
Marginal Tax Rate -0.0000145 0.00009 0.00154**
[0.000093] [0.000061] [0.000167]
0.000686* 0.00159**
[0.000392] [0.00022]
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Demographic Controls
Income, Age Controls
Instrument for Marginal
X X
X
X
X X
X X
X
X
X XTax Rates
Coefficients represent the effect of a one-percentage point change in the indicated variable.
Standard Errors in Brackets. Standard Errors are calculated using clustering at the state level.
** Significantly different from zero at 5% confidence. * Different from zero at at 10% confidence.
All Specifications include Year Fixed Effects. Columns III-V and VII also include state fixed effects.
Columns I and il are estimated with match rates alone.
Columns III, IV, and V are estimated with marginal tax rates alone.
Columns V, VI and VII instrument for marginal tax rates with the simulated instrument value.
When indicated, demographic controls include: dummy variables for gender, marital status, ethnicity, defined benefit
pension availability, and tenure; Income and Age controls include a five-knot cubic spline in income, and age decile fixed
effects.
Column
Method
Count
Match Rate
Tables
T=0.00;
Rate of
Age 0 0.0
25 0.249% 0.24
35 0.332% 0.33
45 0.498% 0.49
55 0.996% 0.99
Table VI: Effect of a Ten Percentage Point Increase in the Match Rate on the Annualized 401(k) Spread
n=0.00 T=0.15; m=0.00
Return Rate of Return
3 0.07 Age 0 0.03 0.07 Age 0
9% 0.249% 25 0.249% 0.250% 0.251% 25 0.24
2% 0.332% 35 0.332% 0.333% 0.335% 35 0.33
8% 0.498% 45 0.498% 0.500% 0.503% 45 0.49
6% 0.996% 55 0.996% 1.000% 1.005% 55 0.99
T=0.00; m=0.50
Rate of Return
Age 0 0.03 0.07
25 0.168% 0.168% 0.168%
35 0.225% 0.225% 0.225%
45 0.339% 0.339% 0.339%
55 0.692% 0.692% 0.692%
T=0.15; m=0.50
Rate of Return
Age 0 0.03 0.07
25 0.168% 0.169% 0.169%
35 0.225% 0.226% 0.227%
45 0.339% 0.341% 0.342%
55 0.692% 0.695% 0.699%
T=0.25; m=0.00
Rate of Return
0.03 0.07
9% 0.251% 0.253%
2% 0.334% 0.337%
8% 0.501% 0.506%
6% 1.003% 1.012%
T=0.25; m=0.5
Rate of Return
Age 0 0.03 0.07
25 0.168% 0.169% 0.171%
35 0.225% 0.226% 0.228%
45 0.339% 0.342% 0.345%
55 0.692% 0.697% 0.704%
T=0.00; m=1.00 T=0.15; m=1.00 T=0.25; m=1.00
Rate of Return Rate of Return Rate of Return
Age 0 0.03 0.07 Age 0 0.03 0.07 Age 0 0.03 0.07
25 0.127% 0.127% 0.127% 25 0.127% 0.127% 0.128% 25 0.127% 0.128% 0.129%
35 0.170% 0.170% 0.170% 35 0.170% 0.171% 0.172% 35 0.170% 0.171% 0.173%
45 0.258% 0.258% 0.258% 45 0.258% 0.259% 0.261% 45 0.258% 0.260% 0.262%
55 0.535% 0.535% 0.535% 55 0.535% 0.537% 0.540% 55 0.535% 0.539% 0.544%
0.01% = one basis point change in annualized rate of return.
Cells contain the difference in the ratio of the annualized internal rate of return between savings inside and outside of the 401(k) plan due to a 10 percentage
point change in the match rate at the specified age, match rate, marginal tax rate, and annualized rate of return.
Simplifying Assumptions: Funds are withdrawn at age 65; No variation in marginal tax rates over time; Marginal Tax Rate at time of contribution equals
marginal tax rate at time of withdrawl; novariation in rate of return over time.
Tables
Table VII: Effect of a Ten Percentage Point Increase in the Marginal Tax Rate on the Annualized 401(k) Spread
T=0.00; m=0.00 t=0.15; m=0.00 T=0.25; m=0.00
Rate of Return Rate of Return Rate of Return
Age 0.00% 3.00% 7.00% Age 0.00% 3.00% 7.00% Age 0.00% 3.00% 7.00%
25 0.000% 0.291% 0.655% 25 0.000% 0.294% 0.668% 25 0.000% 0.296% 0.677%
35 0.000% 0.291% 0.655% 35 0.000% 0.294% 0.668% 35 0.000% 0.296% 0.677%
45 0.000% 0.291% 0.655% 45 0.000% 0.294% 0.668% 45 0.000% 0.296% 0.677%
55 0.000% 0.291% 0.655% 55 0.000% 0.294% 0.668% 55 0.000% 0.296% 0.677%
T=0.00; m=0.50
Rate of Return
Age 0.00% 3.00% 7.00%
25 0.000% 0.294% 0.661%
35 0.000% 0.295% 0.664%
45 0.000% 0.297% 0.668%
55 0.000% 0.303% 0.682%
T=0.15; m=0.50
Rate of Return
Age 0.00% 3.00% 7.00%
25 0.000% 0.297% 0.674%
35 0.000% 0.298% 0.677%
45 0.000% 0.300% 0.681%
55 0.000% 0.306% 0.695%
T=0.25; m=0.5
Rate of Return
Age 0.00% 3.00% 7.00%
25 0.000% 0.299% 0.683%
35 0.000% 0.300% 0.686%
45 0.000% 0.302% 0.690%
55 0.000% 0.308% 0.705%
T=0.00; m=1.00 T=0.15; m=1.00 T=0.25; m=1.00
Rate of Return Rate of Return Rate of Return
Age 0.00% 3.00% 7.00% Age 0.00% 3.00% 7.00% Age 0.00% 3.00% 7.00%
25 0.000% 0.296% 0.666% 25 0.000% 0.299% 0.679% 25 0.000% 0.301% 0.688%
35 0.000% 0.298% 0.670% 35 0.000% 0.301% 0.683% 35 0.000% 0.303% 0.692%
45 0.000% 0.302% 0.678% 45 0.000% 0.304% 0.691% 45 0.000% 0.306% 0.700%
55 0.000% 0.312% 0.702% 55 0.000% 0.315% 0.716% 55 0.000% 0.317% 0.725%
0.01% = one basis point change in annualized rate of return.
Cells contain the difference in the ratio of the annualized internal rate of return between savings inside and outside of the 401(k) plan due to a 10 percentage point
change in the match rate at the specified age, match rate, marginal tax rate, and annualized rate of return.
Simplifying Assumptions: Funds are withdrawn at age 65; No variation in marginal tax rates over time; Marginal Tax Rate at time of contribution equals marginal
tax rate at time of withdrawl; novariation in rate of return over time.
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Table VIII: Calculated Effects on Wealth at Retirement for General Matching Scheme at m= 50%
Parameters
r=0.03 T=0.15 r=0.07 T=0.15 r=0.03 T=0.25 r=0.07 T=0.25
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2.39
2.21
2.05
1.92
1.55
1.43
1.33
1.33
0.84
0.78
0.72
0.59
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.06
2.14
2.02
1.96
1.91
1.86
1.31
1.27
1.23
1.23
0.71
0.69
0.67
0.63
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.63
0.09
0.080.07
Source: Author's Calculations based on detail in the text.
Simplifying Assumptions: Tax Rates and Real Interest Rates are equal throughout lifecycle; Wages grow at the rate
of inflation; Contribution Rate Conditional on Participation and Participation Rates prior to policy change are as in
the dataset (7% and 87% respectively); effects of changes in match rate on contribution and participation rates are
as estimated in Tables IV and V in Column 11; Policy Change is permanent; Mean Annual Income is $60,000 and
accounts are withdrawn at age 65.
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Table IX: Calculated Effects on Wealth at Retirement for Increases in Tax Rates: AT=0.03
Parameters
r=0.03 T=0.15 r=0.07 T=0.15 r=0.03 T=0.25 r=0.07 T=0.25
Age
25 1.42 1.68 1.73 2.29
35 1.38 1.55 1.65 2.00
45 1.34 1.44 1.57 1.77
55 1.31 1.35 1.51 1.59
25 1.31 1.55 1.58 2.10
35 1.27 1.43 1.51 1.84
45 1.23 1.33 1.44 1.63
55 1.20 1.24 1.39 1.46
25 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.19
35 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.17
45 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.15
55 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
25 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11
35 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
45 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08
55 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Source: Author's Calculations based on detail in the text.
Simplifying Assumptions: Tax Rates and Real Interest Rates are equal throughout lifecycle; Wages grow at the rate
of inflation; Contribution Rate Conditional on Participation and Participation Rates prior to policy change are as in
the dataset (7% and 87% respectively); effects of changes in match rate on contribution and participation rates are
as estimated in Tables IV and V in Column V; Policy Change is permanent; Mean Annual Income is $60,000 and
accounts are withdrawn at age 65.
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Chapter 2
2 Portfolio Choice and Trading in 401(k) Plans:
Do Allocative Constraints Bind?
2.1 Introduction
Household savings behavior is of particular interest to economists and policymakers.
Existing literature on the savings behavior of households is substantial, and legislation
that subsidizes targeted savings is commonplace. Perhaps the most widespread
example of subsidized savings mechanisms are employer-sponsored 401(k) plans.
These plans allow the employee to save a portion of their wages before they are subject
to taxation (up to a nominal cap), as well as enjoy tax-free compounding of their savings
until withdrawal at retirement. In exchange, the employee must leave the assets in the
account until they reach a certain age or face back taxes and penalties.19 In addition,
employers often make saving in the company 401(k) plan even more attractive:
employers often automatically enroll employees into the plan, allow for loans against
the plan balance, and match employee's contributions to the plan at a fixed rate.
There is a substantial literature on how the form of savings incentives impact household
participation and contribution rates in 401(k) plans. Milligan (2002), Klein (2009), and
Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002) estimate the effectiveness of the tax incentives on
participation and contribution rates, and Papke (1995), Papke and Poterba (1995), and
19 Current law requires the employee be at least 59.5 years of age.
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others, look at how changes in employer matching contributions can affect participation
and contribution rates into these plans.
In terms of savings incentives and asset allocation, Bodie and Crane (1997) and
Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) explain how households construct portfolios with
varying tax burdens given differences in tax treatment between 401(k) accounts and
ordinary savings; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2005) document an absence of employee
contribution behavior, even when contributions are matched by the employer and the
employee has no withdrawal restrictions. Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003) detail
how portfolios that employees hold in their 401(k) account look substantively different
from their non-401(k) holdings in the overall riskiness, trading frequency 20, and equity
exposure. Ameriks and Zeldes (2000); Bernartzi and Thaler (2001); and Liang and
Weisbenner (2002) illustrate the prevalence of simplistic rules of thumb that seem to
guide employee portfolio choice behavior in 401(k) plans. Choi, Laibson and Madrian
(2004, 2008) show that the order of the portfolio decisions made by the household, or
other seemingly benign aspects of plan design, can have significant effects on the
allocation of assets within a 401(k) plan.
This paper focuses on employee asset allocation behavior in response to employer
matching in Company common stock and trading restrictions on employer matching
contributions. Matching employee retirement savings with company stock is common:
Bernartzi (2001) and Poterba (2003) state that over one third of the total amount of assets
in retirement plans of public companies are invested in company stock, though these
numbers have decreased (slightly) since the publication date. Bernartzi, Thaler, Utkus,
and Sunstein (2004), Poterba (2003), Muelbroek (2002), Ramaswamy (2003) and others
illustrate how cash should be a preferred form of matching when compared to company
stock for three key reasons: cash is flexible (employees can purchase company stock
with cash), company stock contains a tremendous amount of idiosyncratic risk that can
20 The available evidence suggests that outside of a tax-deferred account, investors trade much more
frequently, often to their detriment. See Odean (1999).
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be diversified away with the purchase of a related index, and the performance of
company stock is highly correlated with an individual's labor income risk. This final
point receives much attention whenever the economy declines: employees "over
invested" in their company not only can find themselves out of a job, but also without
their retirement savings if their employer fails.21 Muelbroek (2002) and Ramaswamy
(2003) calibrate a model and estimate that a dollar of matching contributions in
company stock is worth roughly fifty cents to the employee once properly adjusted for
risk. While the theoretical literature is quite clear, there is little empirical evidence to
support the claim that employees manage their 401(k) portfolios with their exposure to
company stock through matching contributions in mind. In fact, there is some
evidence that matching in company stock rather than cash seems to increase the
percentage of employee's discretionary contributions allocated towards company stock
by roughly fifty percent.22
The goal of this paper is to exploit discontinuities in savings rules and incentives both
over time and across employees to see if differences in plan design and portfolio
constraints are associated with predictable changes in portfolio construction, either
through rebalancing the entire portfolio, or through differences in the allocation of new
contributions. In short, this paper addresses the question of whether or not portfolio
constraints in 401(k) plans appear binding in equilibrium.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first section illustrates how matching in a
particular asset and restrictions on trade can alter contribution and rebalancing
behavior through a simplified portfolio choice problem. The second section describes
the unique dataset and the identification strategy used in this paper. The third section
describes the estimation equations used to identify the effect of trading constraints in
the form of vesting restrictions and variation in match rates on employee rebalancing
21 After the 2001 recession and the failures of firms like Enron and Lucent, whose employees were heavily
invested in company stock, there was a dramatic increase in proposed legislation designed to limit
company stock ownership in 401 (k)s.
2 Employee Benefit Research Institute Fact Sheet, 2002
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behavior. The fourth section describes the estimation equations used to identify the
effect of matching intensity on the composition of employee contributions. The fifth
section concludes the paper and offers suggestions for future research.
2.2 The Model
I begin by extending the continuous time portfolio problem in Merton (1971) to include
matching contributions in a particular asset. There are three assets: a risk-free asset (0),
a risky asset (1), and company stock (2). Both risky assets have the same expected
return, p. Investors receive a stream of labor income It. Each investor chooses portfolio
weights pit and consumption cit. Instantaneous savings are matched in company stock
at rate a. The risky assets have their own Brownian motion processes, Zt .23
At every point in time, investors solve:
maxe,,it E[f7 U(cs)ds + UT(cT)]
With the evolution of wealth, Wt given by:
dWt = dAot + dA1 t + dA2 t + dint + (It - ct)
Where Ait is the amount already invested in each asset i, mt is the existing value of the
matching contributions, and (It - ct) is the instantaneous contributions to the plan. The
evolution of A it and mt can be expressed as:
dAot = Aotrdt = Wt potrdt
dAtt = A1ttydt + AitadZit = We pitydt + pitatdZit for i e {1,2}
dmt = mt ydt + a(It - ct) + mtomdZmt
23 For simplicity, we'll assume that the two risky assets are uncorrelated. Relaxing this assumption leads
to another term in the dV(t, Wt) expansion.
Since the matching contributions are provided in terms of asset (2), we know that
dZmt = dZ2 t and Urn = -2 . Rewriting this system in terms of the Jacobi-Bellman
Equation, we have:
V(t, Wt) = max[U(ct)dt + E(dV)] = 0
Ct/Pit
Rearranging terms and applying Ito's lemma, we know:
dV(t, Wt) = Vt + Vw[Wtr + Wt(# 1 t + 0 2 t)( - r) + mty + (1 + a)(It - ct)] +
1
2Vww [Wt(1t O7) 2 + (Wt U2tUo)2 + 2Wt2t U22mt + (mtom) 2]
The first order condition for consumption is given by:
1. U'(ct) = Vw(1 +a)
This is a standard envelope condition, modified by the matching "wedge" of (1 + a).
The first order condition for portfolio shares of the first asset is given by:
VwWt (y - r) + Vww#1t(WtUi) 2 = 0, which implies
2- #1t_ -Vw (p-r)
wtVww al12
As dZmt = dZ2 t, the first order condition for investment in the second asset becomes:
VwWt(p -r) + Vww0 2 t (WtUz) 2 + WtmtU2 2 ] = 0, which implies
-Vw (y-r) mt
3.02 
-wtVww U2 2 wt
Note that equation (3) does not take the same form as equation (2). The presence of the
matching contribution requires additional adjustment of the portfolio shares by the
ratio of matched funds to total wealth. This result is intuitive: ! is the percentage of
wt
wealth in the portfolio from the matching contributions, so this condition requires that
the total investment in the matched asset through incremental contributions and the
existing portfolio share be equal to -Vw (#-r), as in equation (2).24 There is another
notable conclusion from equation (3): in the classical portfolio problem, preferences in
the constant relative risk aversion family lead to constant portfolio shares over time.
That is no longer the case -the optimal portfolio share in the asset that receives the
matching contribution must be adjusted continuously according to the value of t.
wt
2.3 Trading Patterns and Match Rate Variation
Insight on the magnitude of required trades is easiest with a simple example. Under
constant relative risk aversion preferences, the value function is such that optimal
portfolio shares satisfy:
-1 (MU-r) an1 (u-r) mt
#1t = , and #2t = 2
Y al1 Y U2 Wt
Where y is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Since y, yt, r, a, and o2 are fixed,
optimal shares vary over time only through variation in (-L). Applying Ito's lemma to(t
Mtand collecting terms involving a, we find:
It - Ct
=a -Wt
-It-t
Wt
>0
mt1 - t)dt + Adt + BdZ~t + CdZ2t
1- )dt
Wt
>0
24 Note that a naive investor who does not combine dZmt and dZ2 t would set their portfolio shares
continuously to equal:4it = w -and thus "over invest" in the second asset by the fraction .
wtw ai W
d -t
Wt(Mt)
d (V
Wt
da
Where A, B, and C represent terms not involving a . Increasing the match rate increases
the drift of the (tL) process, leading to larger changes in (W9 at each point in time, and
larger trades to recover the optimal portfolio share of p2t = Y U-r) 2
In the data, investors do not reallocate their portfolios continuously. In fact, amongst
401(k) investments, it is quite the opposite.26 This behavior can be explained in part by
transaction costs. In addition to brokerage fees and other monetary costs, 401(k)
participants face a number of frictions that may limit their trading behavior. Employees
must inform themselves as to the performance of the account, the current set of
available assets, and the current rules that restrict trade and reallocation. Often, a
401(k) account is the only financial asset that the household owns. For such
households, it may be the case that reallocating assets within the 401(k) portfolio also
involves acquiring information on financial markets, securities, and risk. Such costs
will lead to decreases in the frequency of trades across plan participants.
The presence of asset-specific matching contributions has two implications that are
tested in this paper. First, fixed portfolio shares are not optimal: employees should
frequently rebalance their portfolios, and this behavior should be driven by a desire to
trade in the matched asset.27 Second, employees with larger match rates should be less
likely to invest in the matched asset.
25 This will remain true until there is no longer an interior solution for the investment in the matched
asset. This may occur under a variety of circumstances, including: very high match rates; in cases where
the matched asset is not mean-variance efficient (this is very likely in the case of Company Stock); or in
cases where the matched asset covaries with It (this is also very likely in the case of Company Stock). At
the boundary, the optimal #2t is zero.
26 Madrian and Shea (2001); Choi, Laibson, Madrian, Metrick (2002, 2004); Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden
(2003); Ameriks and Zeldes (2000); Mitchell, Mottole, Utkus, and Yamaguchi (2006); Liu and Loewenstien
(2002).
27 While the optimal portfolio vector, #* is a function of the match rate offered to the employee, we may
expect to see employees that receive different match rates reallocate their 401(k) portfolio at a different
rate as they have variation in the drift of their process.
2.4 The Data
The data comes from the human resources and benefits data from a large, US-based
company ("Company" hereafter). The Company is a Fortune 500 enterprise in the
manufacturing sector. The data includes information such as date of birth, tenure with
the Company, wages, gender, and location of employment. Information on marital
status and the number of dependents in the household is inferred from health insurance
elections made by the employee. Finally, the data also includes information on the
Company's 401(k) savings plan, including: the matching schedule available to each
employee, data on the employee's own-money and total contributions to the plan, and
the allocation of the employee's assets within the plan over time.
Each year, the Company distributes benefits information that includes a Summary Plan
Description ("SPD") for the 401(k) plan. This SPD contains detailed information on the
benefits of saving within the plan, including specific examples on the effect of tax
deductibility of plan contributions on the employee's take home pay and savings, the
associated pre-tax dollar limit for that year, and the relevant compensation limits from
the Internal Revenue Service. Employees may enroll in the plan at any time by
telephone or through the internet. Employees may then adjust, stop, or resume their
pre-tax and after-tax contribution elections at any time via the phone or the internet.
The investment options are clearly detailed within the SPD, including descriptions of
each fund, the appropriate ticker symbol, and the website for the fund. In 2007, there
were eleven funds that employees could select as well as the Company's common stock,
and a self-directed brokerage plan through a third party organization. The enrollment
website also contains current and historical performance data for each available
security. Dividends are automatically reinvested in their source fund. Employees may
alter their contribution portfolio or their overall portfolio at any time, with the
exception of matching funds, which may only be transferred after a vesting period of
two years, or at any time if the employee is over the age of 55.
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Importantly, while the match rate varies across employees, the difference in match rates
is the only variation in plan details: there is no variation in the investment
opportunities, matching caps, tax deductibility limits, or enrollment procedures across
Company employees. The maximum contribution rate eligible for a match, the
maximum amount of tax deductible contributions, the assets available, the form of the
match (cash vs. Company stock), and the rules and restrictions governing loans and
rebalancing are all identical across all of the employees. Indeed, the Company uses the
same core summary plan description for all employees. Since match rates vary within
the Company, the general SPD states that matching programs may be available to the
employee, the maximum percentage of salary that the Company will match, the form of
the matching (Company stock), and the vesting rules for the matching funds. The
employee's local human resources representatives distribute a supplement to the SPD
with detailed information on that particular employee's available match rate. The
restricted dimensionality of plan benefits within the Company reduces potentially
confounding effects of omitted variables and jointly varying plan benefits. Along with
the detailed trading and contribution records, the similarity of plan details across
employees is a key advantage of this data.
The sample of interest is all active, full time, hourly workers who participate in the
employer-sponsored 401(k) plan. The data is restricted to hourly employees as their
wages are very similar across the firm and the associated distribution of income is free
from the pronounced skewness that is normally of concern when working with wage
data. The sample is further restricted to include only states with more than one
hundred employee-year observations. Table I contains summary statistics on the
sample of interest.
There are fairly low rates of rebalancing by employees. Mean rebalance rates increase
with age and tenure, though the relationship appears to be fairly flat over a large
portion of the data, as shown in Figure 1. There appears to be a persistent difference in
rebalance rates across match rates regardless of age or employee tenure.
Portfolio Constraints of Interest and Identification
There are two sources of identifying variation exploited in this paper: changes in the
employee's status with respect to vesting restrictions, and differences in match rates
across employees. The vesting constraints provide variation in how and how often
employees are allowed to trade in the matched asset, and differences in match rates
provide variation in the (lack of) diversification in the employee's 401(k) portfolios, and
consequently the employee's desire to trade in the matched asset.
The first constraint of interest involves portfolio vesting and tenure requirements.
Employees that receive matching contributions are unable to trade those contributions
for a set period of time, though they are allowed to trade in their own-money
contributions at any time. Once the required time period has elapsed, the funds become
fully vested, and the employee is capable of trading the matching contributions. In
particular, the Company requires that all employer matching contributions remain in
Company stock for a period of two years, after which time the matching funds can be
freely traded however the employee wishes. Importantly, the trading restriction only
applies to the matching funds: the employee is fully capable of re-allocating their own-
money portion of their 401(k) account at any time.
When an employee's tenure in the plan exceeds the two year vesting requirement,
restrictions on their portfolio are relaxed and the employee is able to reallocate and
diversify the matching funds. Variation in the ability to trade in particular assets will
inform how much of an employee's desire to trade results from a need to alter their
holdings in the matched asset. The removal of vesting constraints should lead to an
increase in the propensity of employees to rebalance their portfolio, and an increase in
the propensity to rebalance away from Company stock.
2.5
While vesting restrictions are binary in nature (the employee either is allowed to trade,
or is not allowed to trade), the second constraint of interest in this paper deals with the
intensity of portfolio restrictions and differences in the value of asset re-allocation
across employees. In particular, the Company offers different matching rates across
employees. In the Company, match rates vary on four dimensions: the city and state of
the workplace, whether or not the employee is hourly or salaried, the employee's
subsidiary company, and, amongst hourly employees, the employee's union status.
Retirement benefits are selected by division heads within the firm. For example, two
employees who work for the same subsidiary within the Company, but in neighboring
cities, may receive two different match rates. That said, it is often the case that different
subsidiaries are the result of historical acquisition behavior by the firm, so depending
on the year of acquisition, much of the within-firm variation in match rates may be seen
as variation across firms. There is no within-employee variation in the match rates over
time, unless the employee changes their subsidiary, location of work, or union
membership. While across-employee variation is free of concerns regarding inertia in
portfolio choice behavior, it introduces other issues. The absence of within-employee
variation in assigned match rates makes estimations with time-invariant fixed effects
(ex: state controls) difficult to interpret as the residual identifying variation comes solely
from newly hired and terminated employees, or employees who have otherwise
became eligible for a different match rate, rather than the original match rate
assignment by the respective division heads. 28
28 To this end, the preferred specifications involving match rates do not include state fixed effects, though
their inclusion does not substantively alter the estimated coefficients.
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Employees in the Company are offered matching contributions of 50% or 100% on the
first 6% of wage income. Importantly, there are no employees with 0% match rates: all
employees face plausibly binding portfolio allocation constraints in that they are "over
invested" in Company stock.29 Holding all other effects constant, employees with 100%
matching contributions are required to hold a less diversified portfolio than employees
with 50% matching contributions, though both groups of employees may be expected to
exhibit trading behavior indicative of binding constraints for the reasons detailed at the
outset of this paper.
2.6 Vesting Constraints and Rebalancing Behavior
This dataset contains detailed information on the savings behavior of plan participants.
The contribution rate, individual securities purchased, rebalancing events, as well as the
total balance and composition of the employee's 401(k) portfolio are included. The data
provides detail on the composition of the employee's contributions and total retirement
portfolio; when the employee rebalances their portfolio or alters their contribution
mixture; which assets are traded conditional on any rebalance events; as well as the
standard demographic information on an employee's age, gender, tenure, income, total
401(k) balance, and contribution rates. This level of detail allows for identification of
the effects of portfolio constraints on the asset allocation behavior of employees.
The first question of interest is whether or not vesting constraints that restrict trade in
the matched asset are binding. That is, is there evidence in the data that vesting
restrictions alter trading frequency, flows of assets, or other retirement savings behavior
in meaningful ways?
29 Even employees with a 50% match rate who do not make any own money contributions to company
stock hold of their portfolio in an individual security that is (1) highly correlated with their labor income
and (2) has much more idiosyncratic variation than the market index (the volatility of daily returns of
Company stock is 5.1 times as much as the S&P 500 over the same period).
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I estimate the following specifications on the sample of all hourly employees with less
than eight years of work experience with the Company:
4. yit = xitf3 + zit T+v t + Eit
Where yit is a dummy variable equal to one if the employee has rebalanced their
retirement portfolio during the year30; Xit is a dummy variable indicating whether or
not the employee has vested matching contributions; zit is a vector of simple controls,
including quadratic controls in age, linear controls in tenure and annual income; vt are
year fixed effects, and Eit is a person specific error term. With this specification, an
increase in the employee's propensity to rebalance their portfolio once they are allowed
to trade out of Company stock will manifest as a positive point estimate for the fl term.
Table II contains the results from the estimation detailed above. A Probit model is
estimated, and marginal effects are reported. To allow for intra-group correlation,
standard errors are clustered on the match rate offered to each employee. Note that
with state and year fixed effects, the residual identifying variation comes from
differences in the average tenure of employees across both states and years. As tenure
is perfectly predictable on a sample of existing employees, the identifying variation
with state and year fixed effects comes from changes in the sample of employees in each
state over time through events like hiring, termination, and relocation. Similarly, the
identifying variation with year fixed effects comes from changes in the national sample
of employees through the same events. 31
The point estimates in Table II suggest that employees recently passed the vesting
period are roughly 3-7 percentage points more likely to rebalance their portfolios
depending on the exact specification. Given that the mean rebalance rates and
30 I estimate all specifications separately for 1) any rebalance event, and 2) only rebalance events that
involve transferring funds out of company stock. Transactions involving company stock represent
roughly 60% of all rebalancing events.
31 I present the estimated effects with and without state and year controls. Though there is very little
change in the resulting coefficients, and no statistical difference between the specifications, the
specification without state fixed effects is preferred for reasons discussed above.
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rebalance rates out of Company stock are 21.4% and 12.4% respectively, the point
estimates in Table III suggest that the removal of a vesting constraint is associated with
between one-eighth and one-third of all rebalance events. While the point estimates are
comparable, the estimated coefficients for the effect of vesting on the employee's
propensity to rebalance their 401(k) portfolio by trading any asset (in Columns I, III, and
V) is only marginally significant. However, the estimated effects of vesting restrictions
on only rebalance events including the restricted asset (in Columns II, IV, and VI)
remains stable and statistically significant across all specifications and all sources of
residual variation. The largest estimated effect on trades in the restricted asset comes
from the specification without state and year fixed effects in Column II: the removal of
vesting constraints is associated with a 5.52 percentage point increase in the propensity
to rebalance the 401(k) portfolio through trades in the restricted asset (this is 44.5% of
the mean rebalance frequency of 12.4%). The smallest effect comes from Column VI
with both state and year controls: here, relaxing vesting constraints increases the
propensity to rebalance the 401(k) portfolio by trading the restricted asset by 3.71
percentage points (29.9% of the mean rebalance frequency).
Increases in trading due to the removal of vesting constraints that restrict trade in the
matched asset should impact employees with different match rates differently. I exploit
this by incorporating information regarding the match rates offered to each employee.
Higher match rates may lead to an increase in trading in general, while the interaction
of the higher match rate and the removal of the vesting constraint are also of interest, as
a higher match rate may heighten the desire to trade out of the matched asset and
magnify the effects of the vesting constraint estimated in the previous section.
Table III contains estimates from the following specification:
5. yit = xitfl + zitT + vt + Eit
With yit , Vt, and Eit defined as before, and xit as a vector consisting of: a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the employee has any matching contributions eligible to
trade, a dummy variable equal to one if the employee is offered a 100% match rate, and
the interaction of these two effects. I also include specifications where the vector of
controls, zit, is expanded to include more flexible demographic controls, including:
fixed effects for the employee's age and income deciles, as well as dummies for the
employee's gender, marital status, and union status (coefficients omitted).
Results consistent with binding portfolio constraints through the match rate and vesting
restrictions consist of positive point estimates for all of the xit: employees are more
likely to rebalance once the vesting constraints are lifted; employees are more likely to
rebalance when their portfolios are more concentrated in Company stock as proxied by
a higher match rate; and employees are more likely to rebalance when both of the above
conditions hold.
The estimates for the effect of vesting on the propensity to rebalance remain stable
across the specifications in Table II and Table III through the addition of the match rates
and an increase in the flexibility of covariate controls. Employees are again 3 to 5
percentage points more likely to rebalance once they pass the vesting constraint (though
the additional controls in Table III result in this effect losing significance at the 5%
level). Participants are between 2 and 7 percentage points more likely to rebalance if
they have a 100% match rate instead of a 50% match rate. The effect of vesting remains
when rebalance activity involves trading in Company stock. Employees are roughly 4
percentage points more likely to rebalance out of Company stock (Column II and
Column IV) if they both have passed the vesting cap and have a 100% match rate.
Given the level of rebalancing activity, the point estimates in Table III suggest that
variation in match rates and vesting restrictions can account for between one half and
three-quarters of the mean rebalance frequency for employees who have passed the
vesting constraint and who also have a 100% match rate. Employees are more likely to
trade once their matching contributions have vested, and more likely still if they have a
higher match rate. This effect remains similar in specifications that include time-
invariant fixed effects (Column III and Column IV). In addition to the rebalance
frequency, the detail in this data allows for inspection of the underlying asset flows
during trades.
The second outcome of interest regarding the vesting constraint involves the asset flows
of trades conditional on rebalance events. The data contains detailed information about
the flow of funds in every employee's 401(k) account. For example, when an employee
rebalances their portfolio, the data identifies the source and destination assets and the
dollar amounts traded. This information can be used to see if vesting and match rate
variation impact the cash flows of trades in addition to their effects on trading
frequency.
Any such specification involves scaling the flows out of Company stock. I estimate two
alternate specifications: first, the flows into or out of Company stock as a fraction of the
employee's total 401(k) balance; and second, the flows into or out of Company stock
scaled by the employee's annual income. The first approach has the appeal of being
directly applicable to plan balances, but this measure is subject to quite a bit of noise as
the value of the employee's Company stock holdings and the total account balance
varies due to market movements in the asset values in addition to contribution and
rebalancing behavior. Scaling by annual income avoids some of the volatility present
when trades are scaled by total account balances, but is more difficult to map into
trades as the employee contribution rate itself is endogenous.32
To be concrete, I estimate:
6. yit = xit f + zit T +vt + Eit
With all variables defined as before, but with yit defined as the dollar amount traded
into or out of Company stock scaled by either the total amount of the employee's 401(k)
balance, or the employee's annual wages. As the rebalance frequency is endogenous, I
estimate these specifications both conditional and unconditional on rebalance events.
32Scaling by annual income also generates concerns about division bias: wages enter the estimation
equation as both independent variables and in the denominator of the independent variable.
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Specifically, I use three separate subsamples for employees with less than seven years of
tenure with the firm: for all employees that participate in the 401(k) plan, whether or
not they rebalance their portfolios during the year (7,822 observations); for only
employees that participate in the 401(k) plan that also rebalance their portfolios during
the year (1,644); and finally, for only employees that participate in the 401(k) plan that
also rebalance their portfolio and whose rebalancing events involve trades in Company
stock (951).
The removal of vesting constraints should lead to increased trade in Company stock. If
the vesting constraint is binding, one might expect large flows out of Company stock
once employees can diversify the matching contributions. This effect is likely to be
amplified amongst employees who have a higher match rate and a less diverse 401(k)
portfolio. That said, the results in Table III suggested that higher match rates are
associated with more frequent rebalancing, so the impact of match rates on flows,
conditional on a rebalance event, is ambiguous: employees with higher match rates
appear to trade out of Company stock more often, so the amount taken out of Company
stock during each trading event need not be larger for employees with higher match
rates for them to transfer more out of Company stock in a given year.
Table IV contains the estimation results across three separate subsamples: all employee-
year observations, only employees who rebalance during the year, and only employees
who rebalance into or out of Company stock during the year.
There are several patterns in Table IV. In the first two columns, the estimation sample
contains all employee-year observations and does not condition on any rebalance
events. The point estimates in these columns suggest that the removal of the vesting
constraint is associated with a decrease in the net flows into Company stock of two-
thirds of one percent of the employee's total plan balance, and one half of one percent of
employee annual income, though scaling by income results in point estimates that are
not significantly different from zero. Employees with higher match rates withdraw still
more funds from Company stock once they are vested and allowed to trade their
matching contributions. These estimates suggest that an employee who just passed the
vesting restriction with a 100% match rate on average pulls 1.5% of their total plan
balance out of Company stock (or 0.8% of their annual income) each year, unconditional
on any rebalance events. While the significance of the point estimate for the match rate
varies across the first two columns, the combination of having a 100% match rate and
being vested increases the amount that the employee is expected to pull out of
Company stock each time they trade by 50% of the mean net flows out of Company
stock when measured relative to annual income and by 100% of the flows when
measured relative to total plan balance. Conditioning on rebalancing events (Column
III and Column IV) leads to estimates that are larger in absolute value. Employees who
pass the vesting restriction, have a 100% match rate, and rebalance their 401(k) portfolio
transfer 5.52% of the total plan balance out of Company stock (53.5% of the mean
flows), and they transfer 2.61% of their annual income out of Company stock (41.4% of
the mean flows).
Removal of vesting constraints leads to more trading out of Company stock in every
specification. Match rates appear to increase the amount traded out of Company stock,
though this effect varies in sign and significance across the different samples and
specifications. Again, this may be an artifact of the findings in Table III: higher match
rates lead to more frequent rebalancing, so the asset flows conditional on rebalance
events may well be lower for employees with higher match rates.
2.7 Match Rates and Contribution Composition
The previous section detailed the impact of vesting restrictions on the propensity of
employees to rebalance their 401(k) portfolio, and the cash flows of the trades upon
rebalance events. This section focuses on how larger flows of Company stock into the
employee's 401(k) portfolio through variation in the match rate influences the
employee's own-money asset allocation decisions.
First, I verify that the effects documented in the previous section do not vanish once the
sample is extended to include employees of all tenure, and not simply those nearest to
the vesting cutoff. Table V contains estimates of the effect of match rates and vesting
restrictions on an employee's propensity to rebalance on the full sample of 30,091
employees. I estimate:
7. yit = xit +z + Lit + Eit
With all of the variables defined as in equation (6), though with the sample of interest
extended to include employees of all tenure.
The additional power from the increase in sample size yields significant coefficients on
the effect of the vesting constraint, and the point estimates of the effect of vesting
remain within one to two percentage points of those found in Table III. When an
employee's matching contributions have vested, their rebalance propensity is increased
by five percentage points, while the effect of being vested and having a 100% match rate
increases the likelihood that the employee rebalances and rebalances involving
Company stock by 13.4 and 10.4 percentage points respectively. In Table III, these
values were 10.6 and 7.5 percentage points. Again, the coefficients in Table IV remain
stable in the presence of state fixed effects, despite the time-invariant nature of the
match rate in this sample. In the full data set, the possession of matching contributions
that are vested is associated with more frequent rebalancing events, more frequent
rebalancing events that involve trades out of Company stock, and this effect is
intensified amongst employees with higher match rates.
Vesting constraints and match rate variation appear to impact the frequency of 401(k)
portfolio rebalancing by employees, as well as trades executed conditional on
rebalancing events. The next issue of interest is if employees modify the allocation of
their contributions to account for the presence of higher match rates in Company stock.
Employees with higher match rates should be less likely to invest their own money into
Company stock as their portfolio is automatically more concentrated in that asset, and,
if employees with a higher match have any own-money contributions in Company
stock, they should be smaller than the own-money contributions of employees with a
smaller match rate. The allocation of the contributions portfolio is measured three
ways: first, a binary variable for whether or not the employee invests any of their own
funds into Company stock above and beyond the employer's matching contribution;
second, the actual dollar amount of the employee's total own-money contributions to
Company stock; and third, the percentage of the employee's own-money contributions
devoted to Company stock. Of course, employees who contribute their own funds to
Company stock may react differently to grants of company stock than employees who
do not purchase the asset.33 Stratification on whether or not the employee makes any
own-money contributions to company stock can highlight any differences in the effect
of the match on employee's portfolios based on a revealed preference for Company
stock. The dollar value and percentage measures of contributions are estimated on the
full sample of all employees as well as on the strict subsample of employees who elect
to invest their own money into Company stock. The estimation is done via Probit
estimation for the binary measure, least squares for both the full and restricted sample
and Tobit estimation for the full sample. I estimate:
8. yit = xit f + zieT +vt + Eit
Where yit is: a dummy variable equal to one if the employee purchases Company stock
with their own funds, the amount of Company stock purchased with their own funds,
and finally, the percentage of their own money contributions devoted to Company
stock; xit is a dummy for whether or not the employee is offered a 100% match rate; zit
33 Recall the calculations in Muelbrook (2002) that place the value of company stock at 40-60 cents on the
dollar. Clearly, employees that purchase company stock with their own funds value the security at or
above 100% of the asking price.
is a vector of age, wage, and tenure controls; and vt are year fixed effects. Table VI
contains the results of this estimation.
A higher match rate leads to a decrease in the likelihood of own-money contributions to
Company stock by 19 percentage points (half of the mean rate of own-money
contribution to Company stock). In addition to a decreased probability of contribution,
a higher match rate leads to smaller contributions in Company stock amongst
employees who have positive own-money contributions to Company stock. The
significant negative effect of a higher match rate on own-money contributions to
Company stock is present in every specification. The point estimates from the Tobit
specification are particularly interesting (Column III): as in Table I, the mean level of
annual contributions in the data is roughly $2,800. The average employee who receives
a 100% match rate versus a 50% match rate has an additional $1400 in Company stock in
their total annual contribution. The estimated decline in an employee's contributions to
Company stock due to a 100% match rate versus a 50% match rate is $1,433, nearly
identical to the additional amount of stock provided by the differences in the match
rate. The ordinary least squares estimate (a $648 decline in own-money contributions)
is smaller than the Tobit estimate, but still suggests asset substitution by employees at a
rate of nearly 50%. This is especially surprisingly in light of the findings in Choi,
Laibson, and Madrian (2008) that seem to suggest employees fail to take the form of the
matching funds into account when allocating their own money contributions. These
effects remain negative and significant when estimated as a percentage of total
contributions as well. Employees with a 100% match rate automatically receive 17
percentage points more of their total contributions invested in Company stock.34 This is
very close to the Tobit estimates in Column VI which show an average 17.5 percentage
point decline in the portfolio shares of own-money contributions to Company stock
with an increase in the match rate from 50% to 100%. Increases in the match rate
3 Employees with a 100% match rate, who contribute none of their own funds to company stock, still
hold half of their portfolio in company stock, while employees with a 50% match have one third of their
portfolio in common stock.
decrease both the likelihood that employees invest in the matched asset, and the
amount that employees invest in the match asset.
Table VII contains the estimation equations from Table VI with the set of flexible
covariate controls from the previous section.
The additional covariates lead to some attenuation of the coefficients, but the
significant, negative effects of the match rate on own-money contributions in Company
stock is still present in every specification. Employees are over thirteen percentage
points less likely to invest in the matched asset with a match rate of 100% versus 50%
(one third of the mean contribution frequency). In addition, the variation in the match
leads to a decline in own money contributions to Company stock of $500 in the least
squares specification and $900 in the Tobit specification, which ,with the mean annual
contribution level of $2800, implies asset crowdout rates of 36% and 65% respectively.
This effect remains when asset allocation outcomes are measured in portfolio shares
rather than dollar amounts: the point estimates in Column V and Column VI suggest
that employee's own-money share in Company stock decreases by between 13 and 23
percentage points as the match rate increases from 50% to 100%.
Variation in the match rate has a significant impact on the asset allocation of employee
contributions. As the match rate increases, employees receive larger and larger
fractions of their portfolio in Company stock. This is associated with a decreased
likelihood that employees invest their own funds in Company stock, and, if they still
invest in Company stock, they invest less on average than employees with lower match
rates.
2.8 Conclusion
There are many different variables that impact the optimal portfolio for the household.
This paper focused on the effects of vesting and portfolio allocation constraints on
employee trading and contribution behavior in 401(k) plans. Through a uniquely
detailed and comprehensive human resources dataset, this paper provides empirical
estimates of the impact of vesting restrictions and matching contributions on the
portfolio choice and rebalancing behavior of employees within 401(k) plans. The
effects are pronounced: employees are 3 to 7 percentage points more likely to rebalance
their portfolios once vesting constraints on the matched asset are removed, and this
effect increases to 7 to 10 percentage points when the match rate increases from 50% to
100%. Together, these effects can account for up to half of the mean rebalance
frequency.
In addition to portfolio rebalancing behavior, the composition of employee
contributions changes with changes in match rates. Employees are 14 to 18 percentage
points less likely to contribute any funds to Company stock if they have a 100% match
rate compared to a 50% match rate (33-45% of the mean propensity to contribute to
Company stock). If employees still contribute to Company stock with a higher match
rate, they contribute less of their own funds, with asset crowd out at near one to one
levels. These effects remain for different of measures of contribution behavior and
across a variety of functional forms.
These results suggest that restrictions on portfolio choice and portfolio trading in 401(k)
plans are binding in equilibrium. These point estimates may also inform future
empirical research into the welfare costs of vesting restrictions and of matching in
Company stock relative to cash that can enhance the existing theoretical literature on
the welfare implications of asset-specific matching contributions.
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Figure 2
Rebalance Rates by Tenure with the Firm
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Tables
Table I: Summary Statistics
All Hourly Hourly Employees Hourly Employees
Sample Employees 50% Match 100% Match
Count 33,353 15,880 17,473
Demographics
Percent Hourly 1.00 1.00 1.00
Percent with 100% Match 0.52 0.00 1.00
Percent Male 0.72 0.79 0.66
Percent Married* 0.74 0.82 0.66
Mean Age 46.26 47.70 44.95
Mean Tenure 16.36 18.18 14.70
Mean Annual Income 34,296 35,180 33,494
Median Annual Income 34,466 36,026 32,718
Outcomes
Participation Rate 0.902 0.912 0.893
Dollar amount of Contributions 2,839 3,291 2,418
Contribution Rate 0.080 0.091 0.070
Percent who contribute own funds to 0.368 0.456 0.287Company Stock
Percent of Sample that Rebalances 0.244 0.219 0.264
within the Year
All Employees come from the years 2003-2006 and face either a 50% or 100% match rate.
All Employees face the same matching cap (6% of annual income) and select investments from
the the same menu of assets.
All outcomes except for the employee participation rate are conditional on participation.
There are 30,091 participating employee-year observations.
Tables
Table 11: Propensity to Rebalance Around Vesting Discontinuity
Column I 11 1ll IV V vi
Dependent Variable
Count
Mean of Dependent
Variable
Tenure Range
(in Years)
Coefficients
Dummy if Vested
Age/10
Age Squared/100
Tenure
Wage/1000
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Any Rebalance Rebalance Involving
Event Company Stock
7822
0.214
0-7
0.0706**
[0.0146]
-0.0159**
[0.00233]
0.0018**
[0.00024]
0.0166**
[0.00797]
0.0129**
[0.00049]
N
N
7822
0.124
0-7
0.0552**
[0.0071]
-0.0083**
[0.0021]
0.00091**
[0.00027]
0.0167**
[0.00647]
0.00795**
[0.000438]
N
N
Any Rebalance Rebalance Involving
Event Company Stock
7822
0.214
0-7
0.0439
[0.0288]
-0.0155**
[0.00107]
0.00175**
[0.000081]
0.00793
[0.00882]
0.0110**
[0.00034]
N
Y
7822
0.124
0-7
0.0418**
[0.00216]
-0.00737*
[0.00308]
0.000773
[0.00040]
0.00853
[0.00789]
0.00619**
[0.000062]
N
Y
Standard Errors in Brackets. Standard Errors are Clustered on Match Rates offered to Employees.
* = Significant at 10%, ** = Significant at 5%
All estimates are calculated via Probit methods. Marginal Effects Reported.
Columns I, 11, and Ill estimate the propensity to rebalance the portfolio with any trades.
Columns 11, IV, and VI estimate the propensity to rebalance the portfolio by trading into or out of Company Stock.
Columns I and I contain neither state nor year fixed effects.
Columns 11 and IV contain year fixed effects alone. This is the preferred specification.
Columns V and VI contain state and year fixed effects.
Any Rebalance Rebalance Involving
Event Company Stock
7822
0.214
0-7
0.0323
[0.0382]
-0.0151**
[0.000027]
0.0017**
[0.00005]
0.00753
[0.0076]
0.0123**
[0.000404]
Y
Y
7822
0.124
0-7
0.0371**
[0.00292]
-0.00659
[0.00409]
0.00071
[0.00049]
0.0077
[0.00698]
0.0073**
[0.000071]
Y
y
Tables
Table 11: Propensity to Rebalance Around Vesting Discontinuity- Alternate Specifications
Column 11 111 IV
Dependent Variable
Count
Mean of Dependent
Variable
Tenure Range
(in Years)
Coefficients
Dummy if Vested
100% Match Rate
Vested * 100% Match
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Any Rebalance Rebalance Involving
Event of Company Stock
7822
0.214
0-7
0.046
[0.0332]
0.0556**
[0.0107]
0.0042
[0.00728]
N
Y
7822
0.124
0-7
0.0291
[0.02123]
0.00529*
[0.00317]
0.0408**
[0.00105]
N
Y
Any Rebalance Rebalance Involving
Event of Company Stock
7822
0.214
0-7
0.0435
[0.0286]
0.0849**
[0.00595]
0.00327
[0.00436]
Y
Y
7822
0.124
0-7
0.0282
[0.0183]
0.0218**
[0.0094]
0.0405**
[0.00085]
Y
Y
Age Controls
Wage Controls
Other Controls
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects Decile Fixed Effects Decile Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
Standard Errors in Brackets. Standard Errors are Clustered on Match Rates offered to Employees.
* = Significant at 10%, ** = Significant at 5%
All estimates are calculated via Probit estimation. Marginal Effects Reported.
Columns I and Ill estimate the propensity to rebalance the portfolio with any trades.
Columns 11 and IV estimate the propensity to rebalance the portfolio by trading into or out of Company
Stock.
Columns I and I contain Year Fixed Effects alone. This is the preferred specification.
Columns IlIl and IV contain State and Year Fixed Effects.
All Columns include flexible controls for demographics, including: age fixed effects, fixed effects for the
decile of the wage distribution, as well as gender, marital status, tenure, and union status controls.
Tables
Table IV: Net Cash Flows into Company Stock
Column 1 11 111 IV V VI
Dependent Variable
Eligible Transactions
Count
Mean of Dependent
Variable
Tenure Range
(in Years)
Coefficients
Dummy if Vested
100% Match Rate
Vested * 100% Match
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Net Flows Into
Company Stock/
Total Plan Balance
All Employee-Year
Observations
7822
-0.0218
0-7
-0.00659**
[0.00243]
0.0025**
[0.00111]
-0.0111**
[0.000479]
N
Y
Net Flows Into
Company Stock/
Annual Wages
Net Flows Into
Company Stock/
Total Plan Balance
All Employee-Year Any Rebalance Event
Observations
7822
-0.0133
0-7
-0.00572
[0.0041]
-0.00033
[0.00112]
-0.0018**
[0.000547]
N
Y
1644
-0.103
0-7
-0.0472**
[0.00866]
0.0458**
[0.0037]
-0.0538**
[0.00555]
N
Y
Net Flows Into
Company Stock/
Annual Wages
Any Rebalance Event
1644
-0.063
0-7
-0.0361**
[0.00412]
0.0256**
[0.0117]
-0.0156**
[0.00802]
N
Y
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
Standard Errors in Brackets. Standard Errors are Clustered on Match Rates offered to Employees.
* = Significant at 10%, ** = Significant at 5%
Columns I, 1il, and V estimate the net flows into Company Stock scaled by the employee's total plan balance.
Columns 11, IV, and VI estimate the net flows into Company Stock scaled by the employee's annual income.
Columns I and i use the entire estimation sample of 7822 employees with less than 7 years with the firm, regardless of whether or not they have rebalanced
their portfolio during the year.
Columns III and IV use an estimation sample of 1644 employees with less than 7 years with the firm who have also rebalanced their 401(k) portfolio at some
point during the year.
Columns V and VI use an estimation sample of 951 employees with less than 7 years with the firm who have also rebalanced their 401(k) portfolio by trading
into or out of Company Stock at some point during the year.
All Columns contain Year Fixed Effects alone.
All Columns include flexible controls for demographics, including: age fixed effects, fixed effects for the decile of the wage distribution, as well as gender,
marital status, tenure, and union status controls.
Net Flows Into
Company Stock /
Total Plan Balance
Rebalance Events
Involving Company
Stock
951
-0.223
0-7
-0.0689**
[0.0212]
0.0517**
[0.00925]
-0.00511
[0.00097]
N
Y
Net Flows Into
Company Stock/
Annual Wages
Rebalance Events
Involving Company
Stock
951
-0.139
0-7
-0.1134**
[0.02116]
0.0112**
[0.00213]
0.0387**
[0.01779]
N
Y
Age Controls
Wage Controls
Other Controls
Tables
Table V: Propensity to Rebalance, Vesting, and Match Rates: Full Sample
Column I || Ill IV
Dependent Variable
Count
Mean of Dependent
Variable
Tenure Range
(in Years)
Coefficients
Dummy if Vested
100% Match Rate
Vested * 100% Match
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Any Rebalance Rebalance Involving
Event
30091
0.243
All
0.0634**
[0.00527]
0.05165**
[0.01891]
0.0186**
[0.00322]
N
Y
Company Stock
30091
0.145
All
0.0510**
[0.0020]
-0.00357
[0.00707]
0.05667**
[0.002386]
N
Y
Any Rebalance Rebalance Involving
Event of Company Stock
30091
0.243
All
0.0629**
[0.0197]
0.0793**
[0.00955]
0.0251**
[0.0093]
Y
Y
30091
0.145
All
0.0484**
[0.0086]
0.0088
[0.0085]
0.0651**
[0.00523]
Y
Y
Age Controls
Wage Controls
Other Controls
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects Decile Fixed Effects Decile Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
Standard Errors in Brackets. Standard Errors are Clustered on Match Rates offered to Employees.
* = Significant at 10%, ** = Significant at 5%
All estimates are calculated via Probit estimation. Marginal Effects Reported.
Columns I and Ill estimate the propensity to rebalance the portfolio with any trades.
Columns 11 and IV estimate the propensity to rebalance the portfolio by trading into or out of Company
Stock.
Columns I and i contain Year Fixed Effects alone. This is the preferred specification.
Columns IlIl and IV contain State and Year Fixed Effects.
All Columns include flexible controls for demographics, including: age fixed effects, fixed effects for the
decile of the wage distribution, as well as gender, marital status, tenure, and union status controls.
Table VI: Propensity to Contribute Own Funds to Company Stock
Column
Dependent Variable Binary: Contributed OwnFunds to Company Stock
Estimation Method Probit -
Marginal Effects Reported
Sample
Count
Mean of Dependent
Variable
Tenure Range
(in Years)
Coefficie nts
100% Match Rate
Age/10
Age Squared/100
Tenure
Wage/1000
Full Sample
30091
0.403
All
-0.188**
[0.0154]
-0.0159**
[0.00242]
0.00138**
[0.000221]
-0.00242
[0.0040]
0.0070**
[0.0011]
Amount of Own
Contributions to
Company Stock
OLS
Full Sample
30091
595.85
All
-647.84**
[62.435]
-35.140**
[7.076]
3.869**
[0.8542]
11.427
[12.330]
23.227**
[7.265]
Amount of Own
Contributions to
Company Stock
Tobit
Full Sample
30091
595.85
All
-1433.06**
[35.837]
-95.126**
[13.807]
9.371**
[1.538]
7.036**
[2.119]
54.626**
[2.849]
IV
Amount of Own
Contributions to
Company Stock
OLS
Positive Own Money
Contributions Only
12137
1477.284
All
-923.15**
[100.56]
-46.81**
[14.61]
6.487**
[1.173]
25.98**
[12.358]
42.722**
[6.054]
V
Percent of Own
Contributions in
Company Stock
OLS
Full Sample
30091
0.1884
All
-0.3744**
[0.00838]
-0.0272**
[0.00356]
0.00249**
[0.000408]
-0.000030
[0.000560]
0.00872
[0.000789]
VI
Percent of Own
Contributions in
Company Stock
Tobit
Full Sample
30091
0.1884
All
-0.1754**
[0.01266]
-0.01209**
[0.00261]
0.00116**
[0.000276]
0.00144
[0.00344]
0.00240**
[0.000545]
VII
Percent of Own
Contributions in
Company Stock
OLS
Positive Own Money
Contributions Only
12137
0.467
All
-0.225**
[0.0193]
-0.0113**
[0.000534]
0.00125**
[0.000058]
0.00445
[0.00355]
-0.0013
[0.00186]
State Fixed Effects N N N N N N N
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y y
Standard Errors are Clustered on Match Rates offered to Employees.
* = Significant at 10/o, ** = Significant at 5%
Standard Errors for Tobit Estimation are Bootstrapped with 200 repetitions.
Column I estimates the effect of match rate variation on the propensity to contribute any funds to company stock via Probit estimation. Marginal Effects are Reported.
Columns 11, 111, and IV estimate the effect of match rate variation on the dollar amount of own-money contributions to Company Stock.
Columns V, VI, and VII estimate the effect of match rate variation on the percentage of own-money contributions invested in Company Stock.
Columns 11, IV, V, and VII are estimated via ordinary least squares.
Columns III and VI are estimated via maximum likelihood Tobit models.
Columns IV and VII are estimated on the subsample of 12137 employee-years who have positive own-money contributions to Company Stock during the year.
All Columns contain Year Fixed Effects alone.
Table VII: Propensity to Contribute Own Funds to Company Stock- Alternate Specifications
Column
Dependent Variable Binary: Contributed Own
Funds to Company Stock
Estimation Method Probit -
Marginal Effects Reported
Sample
Count
Mean of Dependent
Variable
Tenure Range
(in Years)
Coefficients
100% Match Rate
Age Controls
Wage Controls
Other Controls
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Full Sample
30091
0.4026
All
-0.135**
[0.0329]
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
N
Y
Amount of Own
Contributions to
Company Stock
OLS
Full Sample
30091
595.85
All
-498.34**
[146.91]
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
N
Y
I1
Amount of Own
Contributions to
Company Stock
Tobit
Full Sample
30091
595.85
All
-884.139**
[50.442]
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
N
Y
IV
Amount of Own
Contributions to
Company Stock
OLS
Positive Own Money
Contributions Only
12137
1477.28
All
-740.05**
[181.897]
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
N
Y
V
Percent of Own
Contributions in
Company Stock
OLS
Full Sample
30091
0.1884
All
-0.133**
[0.0329]
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
N
Y
VI
Percent of Own
Contributions in
Company Stock
Tobit
Full Sample
30091
0.1884
All
-0.231**
[0.0119]
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
N
Y
VII
Percent of Own
Contributions in
Company Stock
OLS
Positive Own Money
Contributions Only
12137
0.467
All
-0.182**
[0.0360]
Fixed Effects
Decile Fixed Effects
Y
N
Y
Standard Errors are Clustered on Match Rates offered to Employees. Standard Errors forTobit Estimation are Bootstrapped with 200 repetitions of sampling clustered on the match rate.
* = Significant at 10%, ** = Significant at 5%
Column I estimates the effect of match rate variation on the propensity to contribute any funds to company stock via Probit estimation. Marginal Effects are Reported.
Columns 11, 111, and IV estimate the effect of match rate variation on the dollar amount of own-money contributions to Company Stock.
Columns V, VI, and VII estimate the effect of match rate variation on the percentage of own-money contributions invested in Company Stock.
Columns 11, IV, V, and Vil are estimated via ordinary least squares.
Columns Ill and VI are estimated via maximum likelihood Tobit models.
Columns IV and VII are estimated on the subsample of 12137 employee-years who have positive own-money contributions to Company Stock during the year.
All Columns contain Year Fixed Effects alone.
All Columns include flexible controls for demographics, including: age fixed effects, fixed effects forthe decile of the wage distribution, as well as gender, marital status, tenure, and union status controls.
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Chapter 3
3 Precautionary Savings, Insurance Generosity,
and Portfolio Choice
3.1 Introduction
Insurance is designed to decrease the magnitude of risks. There is a substantial
literature in economics discussing how the presence of insurance can alter an
individual's behavior towards insured risks. Often, this takes the form of moral hazard,
as insured individuals face something less than the full marginal cost of their behavior
with respect to the insured risk. This leads to inefficiency and represents a substantial
cost to insuring individuals in the economy. However, if households self-insure against
future risks through the accumulation of additional capital, then the provision of
insurance can lead to more efficient outcomes. Such self insurance behavior is called
precautionary savings. Precautionary savings is less efficient than an insurance scheme
between households, in the sense that ex-ante expected consumption can be increased
for all households with an insurance contract that allows for transfers across households
in different states. That is, if households set aside some of their income each period for
use in future states when the discounted marginal utility of consumption is higher than
the present, and the amount of income set aside in this manner increases with the
volatility of the future marginal utility of consumption, then insurance contracts lead to
more efficient outcomes. This paper looks for evidence of precautionary savings
behavior by exploiting variation in insurance benefits and analyzing the impact on asset
accumulation and asset allocation decisions of households.
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Addressing this question requires plausibly exogenous variation in insurance
generosity across households, and the ability to accurately identify savings behavior
over time. If such variation can be found, it is then possible to identify how in
household savings changes with the generosity of insurance: increases in savings (or
total asset holdings) that correspond to a decrease in insurance generosity is evidence of
precautionary savings by households.
Exogenous variation in insurance generosity is difficult to find in data. However, the
design of unemployment insurance in the United States is such that the generosity of
the insurance (often measured by the replacement rate) varies across households
depending on the state of residence, what the unemployment insurance benefits
formulas were in that state in that particular year, and how much labor income the
household received in the period immediately preceding unemployment. The
variation in benefit rules across states and years provides a plausibly exogenous source
of variation in insurance generosity. This paper utilizes the changes in unemployment
insurance benefits across states at a point in time and within states over time to identify
household precautionary savings behavior.
This paper makes four contributions to the existing literature on insurance and
precautionary savings. The first relates to measuring insurance generosity. Insurance
contracts can generally be characterized by incentives that operate on many different
margins. For example, common insurance contracts consist of at least three
components: deductibles that must be paid prior receipt of any payments, coinsurance
rates that must be paid whilst receiving payments, and out of pocket maximums,
beyond which no further payments are made. Increases or decreases in the generosity
of insurance contracts can occur as changes in one or more of these components, and the
relative effects of each component on savings behavior may not be equal. This is
particularly relevant with unemployment insurance: benefits can be characterized by a
payment that the unemployed individual receives each week, and the length of time
payments can be collected. If households are concerned about long periods of
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unemployment, changes in initial insurance benefits (through the initial payment) may
have different effects on savings behavior than changes in benefits for long
unemployment spells (through the duration of payments). This extension yields
estimates of savings behavior that suggest high levels of precautionary responses due to
variation in unemployment insurance replacement rates and benefit durations, though
these results are statistically insignificant.
The second contribution relates to econometric methods. Given the skewness of
financial wealth, the effects of insurance benefits on savings behavior may be quite
different across the quantiles of the wealth distribution. To that end, I estimate quantile
specifications that allow insurance benefits to affect savings differently for households
in different portions of the distribution of financial wealth. These methods suggest that
savings crowd out responses are concentrated amongst households with below median
levels of financial wealth, though this result is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Third, households may have heterogeneous responses to the insured risk. As the risk of
the insured loss varies across households, the precautionary savings response to
variation in insurance benefits is likely to vary as well. I allow for insurance benefits to
impact savings outcomes differently based the risk type of the household through a
two-step estimation procedure. This process suggests that household savings behavior
is more responsive to variation in insurance benefits as the likelihood of the insured risk
increases (larger point estimates for higher risk households), though once this two-step
procedure is bootstrapped for consistent standard errors, the results are insignificant at
standard levels of confidence.
Finally, the composition of household precautionary capital is likely to be different from
the composition of non-precautionary capital. That is, precautionary savings is likely to
be held in very liquid, very safe accounts (like checking and money market accounts), as
the capital may be required at any time, while non-precautionary savings are more
likely to be held less liquid of more risky securities (like certificates of deposits or equity
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securities). 35 I allow the generosity of insurance to alter household asset accumulation
differently across asset classes. This extension is unable to detect systematic differences
in savings responses to unemployment insurance across asset classes.
This paper fits into the much broader literature on precautionary savings, such as
calibrated modeling done by Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994, 1995) and Caballero
(1991), where models that incorporate precautionary behavior better match the capital-
income and age-consumption profiles in the economy. The most relevant literature is
found in Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), and Engen and Gruber (2001). These papers
identify precautionary savings behavior through variation in Medicaid and
unemployment insurance benefits respectively. As identifying variation,
unemployment insurance has some advantages over Medicaid. Specifically, the asset-
tests present in Medicaid may lead to behavior that mimics precautionary savings
(increasing benefits leads to a decrease in asset accumulation), but is driven by the
household's desire to qualify for the insurance rather than to decrease precautionary
capital at the margin. Indeed, recent quantile instrumental variables work done by
Maynard and Qiu (2009) seem to support the hypothesis that savings responses due to
Medicaid are largely because of asset tests rather than precautionary savings motives.
For these reasons, this paper focuses on changes in unemployment insurance benefits as
the source of variation behind precautionary savings behavior. This paper extends the
literature in several ways: by including variation in unemployment insurance
generosity above and beyond the replacement rate; by allowing different responses
across households based on risk type; by searching for precautionary savings behavior
in particular asset classes; and by more flexible estimation in terms of covariate controls
and the functional form of the dependent variable.
3s This is complicated somewhat by the access to credit that certain assets provide. For example, home
equity can be drawn down to smooth consumption, though this is generally restricted when an
individual is unemployed. As such, even though collateralizable assets have liquidity properties that are
somewhat ambiguous, they are unlikely to represent precautionary savings for employment shocks.
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This paper is also influenced by the literature on the benefits of unemployment
insurance to households, whose modern research began with the consumption
smoothing effects of the program in Gruber (1997), and the optimal level of social
insurance in Chetty (2006). This has been recently extended in terms of the provision of
liquidity to cash-constrained households in Chetty (2007, 2008), Chetty and Szedidl
(2006) and the prevention of costly alternative consumption smoothing methods in
Chetty and Looney (2005) and Cullen and Gruber (2000). In particular, the literature on
the provision of liquidity motivates the distinction in this paper between savings in
different asset classes to identify capital accumulation that is likely to represent
precautionary savings (in very liquid, low risk accounts) from accumulation that is
unlikely to represent this behavior.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first section provides background
information on the institutional details of unemployment insurance in the United States.
The second section discusses the dataset and identification strategy. The third section
details the empirical results. The fourth section includes several specification checks
and extensions, and the fifth section concludes the discussion.
3.2 Background on Unemployment Insurance
The ideal dataset for questions regarding precautionary savings and insurance would
contain households that are offered varying degrees of insurance benefits against many
different types of financial risks, such as health insurance, unemployment insurance,
property insurance, and so on. The benefits to the household from the insurance should
be substantial, as the larger the value of the insurance, the more likely variation in its
benefits would lead to changes in household savings behavior. However, insurance
policies are generally written to cover only one type of risk at a time, there is rarely
plausibly exogenous variation across households in insurance coverage and generosity,
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and most insurance contracts cover relatively small risks relative to the present value of
household assets. Unemployment insurance in the United States provides a setting
where the variation in insurance generosity can be seen as exogenous (as the bulk of the
variation in benefits is based on the state of residence), and the insured financial risk of
unemployment is large relative to household income. 36
There is substantial variation in the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits
both within states over time and across states at a point in time. This variation occurs
across multiple dimensions, including nominal weekly benefit amounts and the
maximum duration that the individual can receive benefits. For example, in 2008, the
maximum weekly benefit payable in the state of California was $450, while the
maximum benefit to households in Arizona was only $250 (Department of Labor, 2008).
Benefits are regularly extended during recessions: the maximum length of time that
households can receive benefits varies between 26 and 39 weeks depending on the year
of unemployment, the state of residence, and the replacement rate that the unemployed
household receives. For example, a state may offer a household weekly benefit that
represents a 50% replacement rate and a maximum duration of benefits of 26 weeks, but
also restrict the total amount of benefits so that they do not exceed 25% of the
individual's base period earnings. Such a restriction reduces the maximum benefit
duration to 13 weeks.
The labor market risk facing households is substantial: according to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in early 2008, between 5% and 10% of labor force participants were
unemployed and looking for work.37 This percentage has nearly doubled in the last half
of 2008 and early 2009. Upon unemployment, the financial loss to households is large.
As the average duration of unemployment is between 16 and 18 weeks, households face
36 If there is systematic variation in risk preferences across states, this will confound direct estimation of
the impact of unemployment insurance benefits on precautionary savings. This concern motivates the
instrumental variables approach discussed in the next section.
37April 4, 2008 Employment Situation Summary, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The variation in this rate
depends chiefly on how "labor force attachment" is defined. The BLS provides a variety of estimates.
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a loss of income of $10,000 at the median levels of labor earnings in the estimation
sample.
Unemployment insurance provides benefits that are designed to alleviate some of this
loss. Depending on the labor earnings of the household, the state of residence, the year,
and the duration of the unemployment spell, unemployment benefits can account for
between 20% and 60% of lost labor earnings. Again, as benefit durations are often
increased during recessions, the value to this program increases during periods where
the household has a larger probability of unemployment and a longer expected
unemployment duration.
There are some concerns with using variation in unemployment insurance benefits to
identify precautionary savings behavior. Empirically, the savings rate in the United
States is low. With low levels of household savings, it may be unrealistic to expect large
amounts of precautionary capital, or the large variation in capital necessary to identify
savings responses in the data. This concern is especially valid amongst households at
high risk of unemployment, as they generally have lower annual incomes and lower
accumulated wealth.38 Second, foregone labor earnings are arguably a small part of the
cost of unemployment. Frequently unemployed households are likely to experience
human capital depreciation and lower future wages, neither of which is an insurable
consequence of job loss. Households may engage in precautionary savings because of
such concerns, though variation in unemployment insurance would not be expected to
substantially alter the savings outcomes as these large risks are still present. Third,
while the magnitude of lost earnings due to unemployment is large, the variation in
replacement rates across states is usually on the order of 5-15 percentage points. It may
be the case that this variation is simply too small to highlight precautionary savings
effects. Fourth, the details of the unemployment insurance program are not well known
38 However, Skinner (1988) estimates that up to 56 percent of total wealth accumulation can be explained
through precautionary accumulation due to labor income uncertainty alone. The size of the
precautionary motive in the context of unemployment may be sufficiently large to offset concerns about
low savings.
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to the public: individuals will not adjust their savings behavior with respect to changes
in unemployment benefits if they do not know that any changes in unemployment
benefits have taken place.39
3.3 The Data and Sample of Interest
This paper uses the 1990-1993, 1996, and 2001 panels from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP). 40 The SIPP (along with its topical modules) is designed
to provide monthly information on the earnings, labor force participation rates, social
program utilization and participation rates, demographics, finances, and taxation of
households in the United States. Each panel varies slightly in the size of the cross
section and the duration of the panel: the 1990 and 2001 panels contain three years of
data, while the 1996 panel contains four years of observations. The number of
households in each year varies: there are 1,760 households in the 2003 panel year, and
7,911 in the 1992 panel year. Importantly, the SIPP contains detailed information on
household labor earnings, capital income, and asset holdings. Traditionally, the SIPP
has oversampled low income and otherwise disadvantaged subsets of the population.
While this may be of concern as these households are less likely to have significant asset
holdings, these households are generally more likely to experience unemployment at
any given point in time. There are a few other datasets that could be used to address
this research question, but the SIPP has particular advantages. Compared to the
Current Population Survey (CPS), the SIPP contains more detail on asset holdings and
is focused on a population more likely to experience unemployment; compared to the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the SIPP is a larger dataset with more detailed
39 Information concerns are likely less of an issue amongst households very likely to become unemployed,
or those who have a history of receipt of unemployment insurance benefits.
40 The SIPP changed the structure of the survey substantially in 1996. As a specification check, I estimate
certain regressions on the subsample of 1996 and 2001 surveys alone. These panels were selected over
earlier panels because of their detailed responses regarding financial asset holdings.
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information on financial holdings. In addition, the most comparable existing empirical
work is estimated on the SIPP (Engen and Gruber (2001)).
The SIPP panels were subjected to a series of restrictions to ensure that the estimation
sample was as relevant and reliable as possible. First, households that were not present
for an entire calendar year during the panel were removed to remove noise from annual
income and unemployment insurance benefit calculations. Second, households that
were not employed at any point during entire year were dropped as their labor force
attachment is low (thus the value of unemployment insurance is questionable), and
unemployment benefits cannot be calculated without some measure of wages. Third,
households whose head was not of working age (defined here as below 25 or above 64)
were eliminated as they are not the main beneficiaries of unemployment insurance.
Fourth, households with missing or imputed values, or otherwise unreliable entries for
earnings or wealth during any month were dropped to ensure reliable savings and
income data. Fifth, households must reside in a state that is uniquely identified within
the SIPP: the SIPP state codes for some low population states are combined, and as such
the unemployment insurance benefits cannot be calculated for households in these
states.41 The final sample contains annual observations from 58,921 households across
ten different years over a 13 year time span. Table I contains summary statistics on the
final sample.
There are a few statistics of note in Table I. The average unemployment rate for heads
of households is over 10 percent. This is likely an artifact of the SIPP's oversampling of
low income and disadvantaged populations mentioned above. The high rate of
unemployment is one reason why the SIPP is especially attractive for identifying the
effects of unemployment insurance. In addition, a large percentage of households have
multiple sources of labor income. It is possible that unemployment spells are insured
within the household by spousal (or other individual's) labor supply. This could
41 This removes North and South Dakota, Maine, Vermont, Montana, Idaho, Alaska, Iowa and Wyoming
from the analysis. The state of Michigan is removed as benefits in that state depend on marginal tax
rates, and the low income sample in the SIPP makes such a calculation unreliable.
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diminish the empirical effect of unemployment insurance on savings as the
precautionary behavior takes place through employment rather than capital
accumulation, though this concern is not unique to this sample. The wealth statistics
also reflect the SIPP sampling procedures. Median wealth totals are low when scaled
by annual income. Households seem to hold only about one to two weeks of labor
income as savings at the median. It may be difficult to detect effects of unemployment
insurance on savings with low levels of assets. Finally, the distribution of wealth is
skewed and very disperse. This makes some sort of scaling for wealth holdings
desirable, though the high variance in household wealth may be a factor limiting the
statistical power that used to answer this question.
The objective of this paper is to quantify the effect of unemployment insurance benefits
on precautionary savings. This requires defining a measure of savings behavior. The
SIPP contains information on the size and allocation of the wealth of each household.
The measure of interest is the total financial wealth of the household. "Financial
Wealth" is defined as the total dollar amount accumulated in deposit banks, other
financial institutions, and in stocks and bonds (both government and corporate). Note
that this explicitly does not include home equity accumulation, as home equity growth
can be interpreted somewhat differently than financial wealth accumulation, both in
terms of empirical moments, and in terms of the impact on household behavior
(Skinner (1989)). Financial wealth also does not include savings in individual
retirement accounts or property that is not the principal residence of the household.
These assets are extremely volatile and unlikely to represent precautionary capital:
savings held in retirement accounts and investment property are not easily accessible
and thus unlikely to represent self-insurance against unemployment spells.
There is substantial heterogeneity in asset holdings across households. In addition,
financial wealth totals are quite skewed. Over 25% of the sample report holding no
financial wealth whatsoever, and the 95th percentile belongs to households with nearly
$80,000 in savings. The mean financial wealth holdings are roughly sixteen times the
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median level, and the distribution of financial wealth has a skewness statistic of +40. To
make the empirical results more easily interpretable and comparable to existing
estimates in the literature (Engen and Gruber (2001)), financial wealth holdings are
scaled by annual income. However, I also estimate a variety of specifications with
different measures of household savings, including specifications and methodologies
more robust to highly skewed distributions.
I estimate regressions of the following form:
1. yit = xitfl + zit y + ai + 6t + ett
Where yit is the financial wealth of household i at time t scaled by their income; xit are
measures of unemployment insurance generosity; zit is a vector of covariates and
controls; ac are state fixed effects; St are year fixed effects; and Eit is a household specific
error term. To be clear, precautionary savings behavior is consistent with a decrease in
scaled financial wealth holdings as unemployment insurance generosity increases, or in
the context of the estimation equation above, a negative f# coefficient.
3.4 Identification and Simulated Instruments
As discussed earlier, unemployment insurance is a particularly attractive area for study
as the benefits change yearly and differ across states. That said, a simple regression of
savings rates on unemployment insurance benefits has several issues. First, if
households select where they live based in part on the generosity of government
programs, such a specification will confound the effects of insurance benefits with the
endogenous location selection embedded in household preferences. Second, differences
in the distribution of incomes and unemployment probabilities across states and years
may allow programs to be more or less generous in one area versus another. For these
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reasons, I implement a simulated instruments instrumental variables strategy as in
Currie and Gruber (1996), Engen and Gruber (2001), and Chetty (2008).
The simulated instruments process has several steps. First, every head of household in
a given year is run through the unemployment insurance laws in every state during
that year. This program requires information on the individual's weekly wage, as well
as the number of dependents in the household (as they impact benefit levels in some
states). Information on the regulations used in calculation of unemployment insurance
benefits across states and years is maintained by the United States Department of
Labor.42 The benefit calculator employed in this paper was first developed by Engen
and Gruber (2001) and later extended by Chetty (2008). Second, the nominal weekly
benefit amounts for each household in each state are turned into a replacement rate, the
percentage of their weekly income when employed. Third, the average replacement
rate from a national is sample is calculated in that state in that year. Finally, the average
replacement rate is used as an instrument for the calculated replacement rates for all
individuals that reside in that state in that year. This process is repeated for every year
in the sample. The resulting instrument is purged of any state specific bias in
preferences or initial distribution. Importantly, the differences in replacement rate for
the simulated instrument are a result of changes in the regulations regarding
unemployment insurance generosity across states alone.43 I also estimated the baseline
42 For example, in the state of Florida in the year 2004, weekly benefit payments are determined according
to a four step process. First, the workers baseline wage is calculated: in Florida, the baseline wage is the
worker's earnings during the quarter in which earnings were highest over the preceding year. Second,
the weekly benefit amount is calculated as a multiple of the baseline wage. In Florida, the benefits are
calculated as 1/26th of the labor earnings during the highest quarter. Note that with 13 weeks in a quarter,
this is designed to replicate a 50% replacement rate. Third, this dollar amount is compared to maximum
and minimum benefit levels and adjusted if necessary. In Florida during 2004, these amounts are $32
and $275 respectively. Finally, this nominal benefit amount is divided by the worker's average earnings
while employed to generate a replacement rate. Many states adjust this measure according to how many
children live in the household, have different replacement rate objectives, and different maximum and
minimum weekly benefit amounts.
43 The same procedure is repeated to acquire a reliable instrument for the generosity of unemployment
insurance as measured through the duration of benefits as well. Variation in maximum benefit durations
comes from two sources. There can be hard coded maximum benefit durations that vary across states
and over time, or the benefit duration can be changed due to soft caps that restrict the total amount of
benefits payable to recipients.
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specifications with a fixed national sample in a given year with no substantive change
in the coefficients. I present only the variable year simulated instrument as this greatly
increases the sample size (as the fixed sample allows the use of only one panel) and the
variable year instrumental variables approach is comparable to existing work in Currie
and Gruber (1996), and Engen and Gruber (2001).
The simulated instruments process purges the unemployment insurance benefits of
state-varying endogeneity at the cost of household level variation. Remaining variation
in the benefits measures varies only across states and years, rather than across each
individual household at every point in time. In the presence of state and year fixed
effects, the residual identifying variation in the benefits measures comes from the
difference over time in the difference of the plan rules between states at a point in time.
That is, a standard difference-in-difference type estimator. Table II contains summary
statistics on the variation of the individual level replacement rate and benefit duration
as well as the corresponding simulated instrument within and between individual
states in the estimation sample of 58,915 household-years.
Mean simulated replacement rates vary from 33% in New Hampshire to 58% in Rhode
Island. The twenty five percentage point difference represents 55.56% of the mean
replacement rate of 45%. There is substantial variation within states over time as well.
The within-state standard deviation of replacement rates is usually between 25-50% of
the mean replacement rate. In terms of nominal weekly benefits, the state with the
lowest average weekly benefit is Mississippi at $158, and the highest weekly benefit is
in the state of Washington at $359; a $201 difference (86.2% of the mean weekly benefit
of $233). Benefit durations have less variation both over time and in the cross section,
as the standard deviation of benefit durations is between 15 and 25% of the mean
maximum benefit duration for each state. The maximum difference in benefit durations
across states is over one month: the most generous states have nearly 33 weeks of
benefit availability, and the least generous states have 27 weeks of benefits.
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The simulated instruments approach allows for straightforward identification of the
effect of insurance generosity on household savings. Again, the estimation equations
are of the following form:
2. Yit = xft 1 + X2itf2 + zity + at + 5t + Eit
Where yit, zit, aj, 5t, and Ett are defined as in equation (1), and the measure of insurance
generosity (xlit and x20t) is the household's eligible replacement rate, maximum eligible
duration of benefits, or both. I estimate several different regressions using different
functional forms and controls in the zit. These include: no covariate controls
whatsoever; high order polynomials in earnings and the age of the household, as well
as gender, marital status, educational attainment, race, and spousal labor supply fixed
effects44; and finally, a specification where the polynomial controls in age and income
are replaced with flexible cubic splines. Of course, as the covariate controls become
more and more flexible, there is less and less residual identifying variation in the
insurance benefits. In particular, the most flexible set of covariates and controls absorbs
70% of the total variation in insurance generosity.
First, I estimate a special case of equation (2) where the only measure of benefit
generosity is the simulated replacement rate that the household can receive from
unemployment insurance. Table III contains the coefficients from this estimation
procedure. Table III includes all three specifications for zit, as well as regressions
estimated through ordinary least squares, a reduced form regression on the raw
simulated instrument itself, and an instrumental variables approach estimated through
two-stage least squares. Finally, a comparable point estimate from Engen and Gruber
(2001) is included. 45
44 By design, this specification is very similar to the one employed in Engen and Gruber (2001).
4 For the purposes of comparison with the Engen and Gruber (2001) output, I estimate a specification
without clustered standard errors in Column VI of Table III.
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The point estimates from the instrumental variables specifications are all negative:
increases in insurance generosity correspond to decreases in financial wealth
accumulation, though none of the specifications meet the standard tests for statistical
significance. The lack of precision could be due to a variety of factors, though the most
likely is the high variation in household savings rates, as documented in Gruber (2000).
The lack of statistical significance is despite point estimates that appear large in absolute
value. In particular, the estimate from Column V of Table III suggests that decreasing
unemployment insurance benefits by 10% (a 4.5 percentage point drop at the mean
replacement rate of 45%) would lead to an increase in financial wealth to asset holdings
of 0.026 (an increase of 4.8% at the mean financial wealth to asset ratios of 0.542). An
increase in financial wealth holdings of 0.026 represents an increase in assets equal to an
additional ten days of labor income. A 10% decrease in replacement rates causes an
individual receiving the mean replacement rate that experiences an unemployment
spell of six months to lose benefits equal to 2.25% of their annual income, or roughly
eight days of labor earnings. That is, the point estimate suggests that changes in
unemployment insurance benefits are completely offset by savings behavior. This effect
is 16.4 times larger than the comparable coefficient from Engen and Gruber (2001),
which is included in Column VII of Table 111.46
Table IV contains the coefficients on selected covariates and controls from the
specifications in Table III. Households seem to hold more financial wealth as they
become older, when they are married, and they hold less wealth when they have more
children.
There is more than one component to the generosity of insurance benefits. In particular,
unemployed individuals receive a given replacement rate from for a given period of
time. It may be the case that precautionary capital is accumulated to smooth
46 This coefficient is taken directly from Engen and Gruber (2001). The coefficients from the comparable
specification, when estimated on this data, are included in Column VI of Table III. When replicated on
this sample, the resulting coefficient of -0.908 is 25 times larger (in absolute value) than the -0.0362
coefficient from Engen and Gruber (2001).
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consumption over particularly long unemployment spells, rather than increasing
consumption during relatively brief periods without labor income. To that end, I
estimate equation (2), allowing the eligible benefit durations to impact savings behavior
alongside the replacement rate.
Table V presents the results of ordinary least squares and instrumental variables
regressions on replacement rates and benefit durations individually and
simultaneously.
The instrumental variables specification yields negative point estimates for both of the
measures of benefit generosity as in Table III. Once again, the household savings data
appears too noisy for the estimates to be distinguishable zero at any reasonable level of
confidence. In the joint instrumental variables specification with both benefit durations
and replacement rates (Column VI), replacement rates have a similar effect as in the
instrumental variables specification in Table III, which suggests an almost perfect offset
to changes in unemployment insurance benefits through household savings. The point
estimate on maximum benefit durations in Column VI of Table V suggests that
removing one week of benefits leads households to increase their scaled financial
wealth holdings by 0.0229, or an extra 1.19 week's worth of income in their wealth
holdings. The coefficient on the replacement rate implied 100% crowd out of
unemployment insurance benefits with savings, and the coefficient on benefit durations
suggests nearly 120% crowd out. Despite these effects, neither point estimate is
statistically distinguishable from zero. The lack of power in these hypothesis tests
suggests that specifications more robust to volatile dependent variables may be
required.
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3.5 Alternative Dependent Variables and Quantile
Estimation
Thus far, I have concentrated on savings responses as measured by changes in the total
value of the household's financial asset holdings scaled by their annual income. This
had several advantages. Scaling by annual income allowed for wealth accumulation to
be interpreted through the number of weeks of labor income accumulated. This is a
natural way to view the effects of replacement rates and benefits, as they are measured
in weeks: coefficients imply a level of crowd out either based on an unemployment
spell of a given length (for replacement rates) or directly (in the case of maximum
benefit durations).
However, this measure of savings may be too volatile or too arbitrary to detect
responses to insurance generosity. To this end, I also estimate the baseline
specifications in equations (2) and (3) for a variety of different dependent variables,
including: the natural log of financial wealth, the natural log of financial wealth scaled
by income, and the raw level of financial wealth. The natural log specification has
advantages and disadvantages. While logs are easily interpretable in terms of
percentage changes in wealth, and the distribution of the natural log of wealth is much
less skewed than the distribution of raw wealth, all of the households with zero
reported wealth holdings are eliminated from the specification. In this sample, that
removes 14,488 households (24.6%). The same sample loss is seen for log of financial
wealth over income, though this specification retains the interpretation of savings in
terms of weeks of income that allows for easy comparison to unemployment insurance
benefits. Raw financial wealth totals are plausibly the most robust measure, as they are
free from concerns regarding scaling and functional form. That said, wealth is
extremely skewed, and estimates of mean effects are difficult to interpret across
households. To accommodate these concerns, raw financial wealth specifications are
estimated with quantile regression, an approach more suited to high levels of skewness
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and volatility as is present in financial wealth. For the quantile specifications, I estimate
the effects of the simulated instrument directly on the 30th percentile, the median, and
the 70th percentile of financial wealth.47
As before, I estimate:
3. Yit = x1itl 1 + X2itf2 + Zity + ±i + ±t + Eit
With xitfl1 , X2itJ2, zity, aj, St, and Eitdefined as before, but with yit representing log
financial wealth, log financial wealth when scaled by annual income, and raw financial
wealth depending on the specification. Table VI presents the effects of unemployment
insurance benefits as measured by simulated replacement rates and benefit durations
on savings for the alternate definitions of savings discussed above.
The alternative dependent variables do not provide statistically significant coefficients
that are systematically different from the estimates in Table V. While replacement rates
appear marginally significant in the natural log specification, this vanishes in the
quantile regression. The bootstrapped standard errors in the quantile specification are
such that the largest t-statistic in absolute value across all quantile specifications is 0.24.
Changing the definition and functional form of savings parameterization of savings
does not substantively change the significance of the effects of insurance generosity.
3.6 Incorporating Probability of Unemployment
Households are unlikely to change their savings behavior due to changes in
unemployment insurance benefits if the households are unlikely to receive those
benefits. Heterogeneity in the probability of unemployment across households may
47 Given the pronounced skewness in financial wealth, I find a reduced form estimation is easier to
interpret for quantile specifications than a quantile instrumental variables specification, while still
maintaining the same identification assumptions.
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lead to heterogeneity in the savings responses. Estimating a specification that can
accommodate a differential response across households requires some way of
identifying households that are at relatively high risk of becoming unemployed at every
point in time.
The SIPP contains the three digit industry codes of the household's principal employer.
There are roughly two hundred and fifty unique three digit industry codes present in
the dataset. With the additional assumption that the industry the household is
employed in impacts savings behavior only through the industry's effect on the
household's probability of unemployment, this information can be used to distinguish
between households based on probabilities of unemployment through a two-step
estimation procedure. This estimation procedure will fail if systematic differences
exist in benefits or in employee preferences across industries that lead to aggregate
differences in savings behavior. In addition, this procedure requires that the industry
of employment has a non-trivial impact on unemployment probabilities. This can be
tested in the data. The average annual unemployment rate in the sample is 10.7%,
while the unemployment rate across three digit industry code varies from 0.00% to
42.8%, with the 25th and 75th percentiles given by 6.5% and 16.67%, respectively. 48 The
variation of unemployment rates across industries will be used to incorporate
probability of unemployment into the savings specifications through a two-step
procedure.
First, I estimate unemployment rates through the following equation:
4. X3it = Ait + i1itfth + 2 3 2 + zity + a, + St + Eit
Where X3it is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the head of household
became unemployed during the year; A are the set of fixed effects representing for the
48 A regression of a dummy variable that indicates unemployment on industry fixed effects alone yields
an F-statistic of 10.68, which with 241 restrictions on 58,915 observations is significant at more than the
0.0001 level of confidence.
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industry where household i is employed in year t; zit, ai, St, and Eit are defined as in
equation (1); and x11it and -i-t are the simulated instruments for the replacement rate
and maximum benefit duration offered by unemployment insurance. Given the
predicted values of X3it from equation (4), I transform the continuous measures of
unemployment probability to a binary variable that is equal to one if the household's
predicted probability of unemployment is greater than the median rate of
unemployment in the sample. Given this measure of the likelihood of unemployment,
I then estimate:
5. yit = x 1 t f 1 + X2itfl2 + x1iXelitfl3 + X2itXit f 4 + xitf5 + zity + ai + St + eit
Where xit is the dummy variable that equals one if the household is at relatively high
risk of unemployment during the year and all other variables are defined as in equation
(1). This specification allows for the generosity of unemployment insurance as
measured by replacement rates and benefit durations to impact household savings
differently based on the household's relative risk of unemployment. As with any two-
step procedure, the standard errors is the second stage have to be adjusted for the
estimation in the first step. To this end, I bootstrap the entire two-step process with 100
repetitions. Table VII contains the estimated fl coefficients from equation (5) that
incorporate variation in unemployment probabilities. Precautionary savings effects are
consistent with decreased wealth accumulation as replacement rates and benefit
durations increase, especially amongst households that are more likely to become
unemployed. In equation (5), this can be expressed as negative coefficients for #1 - 84.
Controlling for heterogeneity in unemployment probability decreases the magnitude of
the point estimates for replacement rates, but the specification fails to yield point
estimates that are statistically significant. The new estimates of changes in financial
wealth due to variation in the replacement rate (Column II) suggest that households
with relatively low probabilities adjust their savings due to variation in unemployment
insurance benefits less than households with high probabilities. The specification
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including replacement rates, benefit durations, and unemployment probabilities
(Column IV) yields point estimates on the replacement rate that are much smaller in
magnitude, and households that are at high risk of unemployment adjust savings due
to variation in the replacement rate nearly four times as much as low risk households.
The signs of the coefficients on unemployment probability terms interacted with
benefits are negative, but none of the estimated coefficients on replacement rates,
maximum benefit durations, or the interactions with unemployment probabilities
appear significant. Allowing household savings to respond to insurance benefits
differently based on the likelihood of the insured risk is insufficient to detect any
behavioral responses in this data.
3.7 Portfolio Choice
Capital dedicated to precautionary savings should be readily accessible at low cost.
Wealth accumulated due to precautionary motives will likely be held in low risk, liquid
assets. This suggests looking for differential effects on wealth accumulation across asset
classes. Heterogeneous asset accumulation can also provide additional information on
the costs of precautionary capital accumulation. 49 Importantly, if precautionary capital
is concentrated in particular asset classes, households may engage in precautionary
behavior without increasing their total financial wealth holdings. Instead, decreases in
insurance benefits may lead to households holding more liquid and lower risk
49 Liquidity is expensive: the difference in annualized rates of return between FDIC insured savings
accounts and certificates of deposit or US Treasury bonds (all assets guaranteed by the Federal
Government) is measured in hundreds of basis points. Not only is there the possibility of an over-
accumulation of capital relative to a cross-household insurance scheme as in the typical precautionary
savings framework, but each individual portfolio may be allocated inefficiently as it will contain too
much liquidity and thus receive a lower annualized rate of return. It is important to note that this
statement is true even holding risk constant (ex: an FDIC insured savings account versus an FDIC insured
Certificate of Deposit), but changes in portfolio composition almost always imply changes in risk, so
calculating welfare loss due to allocative inefficiency of portfolios is difficult. Such calculations are
beyond the scope of this paper.
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portfolios: a reallocation of financial wealth rather than an increase in its absolute level.
This possibility requires distinguishing between different types of assets held by the
household. The SIPP contains survey questions on the total amount and the
concentration of the household's portfolio. I characterize assets as liquid or
illiquid/otherwise non-precautionary according to the following matrix:
Asset Classification
Financial Non-Financial Liquid Illiquid /Non-Type of Asset Precautionary
Checking Account X X
Savings Account X X
Money Market Account X X
Certificate of Deposit X X
Government Bond X X
Other Government Security X X
Corporate Bond X X
Equities X X
Retirement Account X X
Royalties X
Non-Residence Property X
Equity in Principle Residence X
Other Assets X
Many of illiquid/non-precautionary assets in the Asset Classification table can be
transformed into cash. For example, equities, bonds, and certificates of deposit can be
redeemed for cash with little notice. However, the volatility in equities makes them an
unlikely vehicle for precautionary accumulation of capital, and transformation of
certificates of deposit or retirement accounts into cash is associated with fees and
penalties that often exceed ten percent of the amount invested in the asset. Such high
volatility and costly penalties make these assets very unattractive for precautionary
capital accumulation. I replace the general financial wealth measures of savings with
measures of liquid and illiquid wealth as depicted in the Asset Classification table.
Assets classified as financial enter into the financial wealth to income calculations, while
non-financial assets do not. Assets classified as liquid financial assets enter into the
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liquid wealth over total income calculation, and non-precautionary assets are used to
calculate the non-precautionary wealth to income ratio. Figure 1 presents the
probability that the household owns any given asset across quantiles of the distribution
of wealth, organized by liquid (Figure 1-A), illiquid and non-precautionary (Figure 1-B),
and non-financial assets (Figure 1-C).
Recall from Table I that the median household's financial wealth holdings for this
sample are $1,100, and median household annual income is $44,586. The median
household accumulates enough savings to offset 1.28 weeks of unemployment. These
1.28 weeks of savings appear to be spread across multiple different types of assets. At
the median financial wealth level of $1,100, households have between an 80% and 90%
probability to hold checking or savings accounts, and a 70% probability to have
retirement accounts of some form (through 401(k) accounts, Individual Retirement
Accounts, or Keogh Accounts), and a 60% to 70% probability of having any equity in
their primary residence. The probability of asset ownership rises essentially
monotonically with wealth levels, and the median household appears to be quite likely
to hold several different kinds of assets. At the 70th percentile of financial wealth
($5,500), the median household holds enough financial wealth to offset 6.41 weeks of
unemployment, and this wealth appears to be spread across more asset classes than for
the household at the 50th percentile. At the 70th percentile of financial wealth,
households have greater than a ten percent chance of holding stocks, bonds, property,
certificates of deposit, and money market accounts. There appear to be many
households, even at low absolute wealth levels, that own a variety of different kinds of
assets. The SIPP contains ownership information for twelve total asset classes. 50 In
order to detect differences in portfolio construction due to variation in unemployment
insurance benefits, it needs to be the case that a large fraction of households are making
non-trivial portfolio allocation decisions among these different asset classes.
50 These include: checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, certificates of deposit,
stocks, bonds, retirement accounts, investment property, equity in main residence, royalties, and other
financial assets.
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Figure 2 presents selected percentiles of the distribution of the number of different asset
classes held by the household across the quantiles of the distribution of wealth.
The complexity of the household's portfolio as measured by the number of distinct asset
classes within the portfolio increases monotonically with financial wealth levels. The
median financial wealth household holds between two and three different asset classes
on average, and the household at the 70th percentile of the financial wealth distribution
holds between three and four assets, while the most diverse households have five
different classes of the twelve total that are identified in the SIPP. Even the poorest
households, with only $100 of assets, on average hold at least two different types of
assets on average (most likely checking and savings accounts). It appears that
households make substantive asset allocation decisions at many different wealth levels,
and that the complexity of the asset allocation increases with financial wealth, despite
the small amount of accumulated wealth relative to annual income.
Given the asset allocation decisions of households, it may be possible to detect
precautionary savings behavior isolated amongst particular asset classes. This
motivates replacing the dependent variable with liquid financial wealth to income and
non-precautionary financial wealth to income as defined in the asset classification table,
and looking for savings responses to replacement rates and benefit durations within
these asset classes. I estimate:
6. Yit = Xtmfl1 + X2it/02 + XltX3itfJ3 + X2itX3itfl4 + X3itfls + zity + ai + St + Eit
Where x1t, x2it, x3it, Zit, ai, 5t, and Eit are defined as in equation (5), and yit is defined
as the ratio of total financial wealth to income, liquid financial wealth to income, or non-
precautionary wealth to income, depending on the specification. The results from this
estimation procedure are shown in Table VIII. Every specification including xi is
estimated according to the two-step procedure with the first step given by equation (4),
and two-step standard errors are calculated via bootstrapping with 100 repetitions.
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Again, there is not enough power to detect changes in savings behavior. The
magnitude of the coefficients has decreased relative to the specifications in Table VII,
and the point estimates in Table VIII are essentially indistinguishable from zero at any
level of confidence. There are several possible explanations for the lack of power in
this sample. The most likely is that household savings behavior is very volatile and
there isn't enough power in the 58,915 observations to detect any changes in savings.
Allowing household savings to respond to insurance benefits differently based on the
liquidity and risk characteristics of assets was insufficient to detect any behavioral
responses in this data.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper uses variation in unemployment insurance benefits to detect changes in the
household's accumulation of precautionary capital. This paper augments previous
research by extending the estimation sample to include more recent data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation, and then extending the model in several
directions. First, the measures of insurance generosity are allowed to vary across
multiple aspects of the unemployment insurance program. Previously, much of the
attention was devoted to the effect of replacement rates, though unemployment
insurance generosity varies in a number of ways. This paper extends the simulated
instruments approach used to identify the effects of replacement rates to the maximum
eligible duration for unemployment insurance benefits to see if different measures of
benefit generosity impacted precautionary savings behavior in different ways. Second,
quantile estimation methods and were included to accommodate the skewness in
financial wealth accumulation and possible heterogeneous response to insurance
benefits by households of different wealth levels. Third, this paper allows for
heterogeneous responses by households based on the likelihood of the insured risk.
The household's unemployment probability is instrumented with the industry of
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employment, and the relative risk of unemployment is allowed to impact household
savings behavior. This two-step process allows households to respond to
unemployment insurance benefits with different intensities based on their
unemployment probabilities. Fourth, this paper allows precautionary capital to be
accumulated in different asset classes based on the liquidity and risk characteristics of
the assets. Though wealth holdings relative to annual income are small for the median
household, there are non-trivial asset allocation decisions made by households in the
data that support a precautionary/non-precautionary dichotomy based on the liquidity
and risk characteristics of individual assets.
These procedures were unable to detect any significant evidence of precautionary
savings behavior due to variation in unemployment insurance across households.
There are a variety of possible explanations for this, ranging from the relatively small
size of the unemployment insurance benefits themselves, to extreme variation in
household savings, to the household's lack of knowledge of the variation in
unemployment insurance benefits.
Future research in this area may want to utilize different types of insurance to identify
changes in precautionary behavior. Variation in unemployment insurance benefits may
not be large enough to generate detectable household savings responses. The challenge
is to discover plausibly exogenous variation in insurance benefits across households
outside of the realm of unemployment insurance, especially in a dataset that contains
detailed asset accumulation and asset allocation information.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics on Sample of Interest
Panel 1: Household Demographics
Full Sample
Number of Households
Percent Married
Percent with Male Head
Percent White
Percent with at least some
College Education
Mean Number of Children in
the Household
Percent of Married
Households with Working
Spouse
Mean Age of Head of
Household
Percent of Households
where Head Experiences
Unemployment
58,915
0.67
0.67
0.85
0.58
1.00
1991 1992 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003
5,545 7,911 7,482 3,189 5,312 7,325 5,625 7,645 7,121 1,760
0.73 0.72 0.72 0.75 0.73 0.65 0.65 0.56 0.57 0.56
0.78 0.76 0.76 0.67 0.66 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.57 0.56
0.88 0.87 0.88 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.83 0.84
0.55 0.56
1.02 1.00
0.57 0.55
1.03 1.15
0.56 0.61 0.61
1.10 0.98 0.96
0.63 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.71 0.71 0.66 0.66
41.63
0.59 0.60
0.96 0.95
0.65 0.66 0.65
41.19 41.28 41.49 40.47 41.17 41.86 42.33 41.63 42.34 42.91
0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.13
Panel II: Income and Wealth
Full Sample 1991 1992 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003
Median Income- Head of 28,050 26,448 26,680 27,185 25,252 25,685 28,848 29,889 29,611 30,763 31,694
e olHousehold
Median Total Household 44,586 40,011 40,170 42,225 40,933 42,524 46,740 48,718 48,269 50,270 51,037Income
Median Financial Wealth 1,100 2,130 2,100 1,787 482 500 1,136 1,350 680 700 600
Mean Financial Wealth 17,841 16,652 17,806 18,571 14,707 15,925 18,627 26,005 16,818 1,487 17,170
Median Liquid Wealth 910 1,499 1,499 1,200 400 388 1,000 1,000 500 576 500
Mean Liquid Wealth 7,201 7,259 7,435 6,885 5,054 5,150 7,540 8,061 7,862 7,541 8,987
Summary Statistics are from 1990-1993, 1996, and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
Sample Selection criteria are detailed in the text.
Financial Wealth is defined as the sum of the household's asset holdings in checking accounts, assets held in banks and other financial instituitions, stocks, and
corporate and government bonds.
Liquid Wealth is defined as the sum of the household's asset holdings in checking accounts and assets held in the bank.
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Table II: Unemployment Insurance Generosity by State
Standard Deviation of
Number of Mean Nominal Standard Deviation Mean Replacement Standard Deviation of Mean Maximum Maximum Duration of
State Observations Benefit of Nominal Benefit Rate Replacement Rate Duration of Benefits Benefits
Alabama 980 175.86 23.62 0.44 0.21 30.14 6.61
Arizona 1,443 177.40 35.06 0.40 0.18 29.61 5.84
Arkansas 537 217.04 78.02 0.50 0.16 28.65 5.07
California 7,425 202.32 63.96 0.38 0.16 31.80 6.41
Colorado 841 246.52 93.56 0.43 0.12 30.62 5.60
Connecticut 726 331.87 77.97 0.47 0.19 33.47 6.43
Delaware 191 272.13 53.59 0.48 0.21 32.80 6.33
District of Columbia 142 262.68 72.14 0.46 0.18 32.33 6.42
Florida 3,060 206.74 67.27 0.47 0.15 30.68 6.24
Georgia 1,819 226.42 45.66 0.44 0.21 26.76 7.22
Hawaii 139 290.01 86.68 0.54 0.19 33.20 6.49
Illinois 2,559 293.77 78.03 0.47 0.20 33.03 6.48
Indiana 1,523 193.79 68.21 0.41 0.20 29.75 7.11
Kansas 682 234.92 67.08 0.49 0.18 29.36 5.97
Kentucky 854 220.34 79.24 0.51 0.15 29.18 5.36
Louisiana 969 161.13 60.91 0.43 0.13 29.28 5.17
Maryland 1,013 236.60 43.00 0.39 0.19 32.61 6.50
Massachusetts 1,239 337.77 111.34 0.52 0.19 35.00 4.47
Minnesota 1,694 264.85 87.57 0.47 0.15 30.31 5.76
Mississippi 851 157.82 41.09 0.44 0.18 30.25 6.01
Missouri 1,530 187.20 44.31 0.42 0.19 30.06 6.13
Nebraska 714 173.14 59.01 0.39 0.17 30.33 5.93
Nevada 282 240.78 55.33 0.45 0.16 29.85 5.58
New Hampshire 403 175.18 47.38 0.33 0.17 31.48 6.43
New Jersey 1,917 309.61 107.66 0.51 0.18 30.88 6.30
New Mexico 251 196.14 56.80 0.46 0.18 30.55 6.18
New York 3,675 236.58 94.27 0.45 0.14 32.92 6.49
North Carolina 1,982 233.99 85.78 0.51 0.14 32.45 6.50
Ohio 2,532 219.45 70.23 0.44 0.13 32.17 6.49
Oklahoma 1,032 226.24 77.45 0.51 0.17 31.29 6.39
Oregon 928 269.55 88.71 0.53 0.16 29.10 5.11
Pennsylvania 2,938 292.66 96.02 0.53 0.16 31.93 6.48
Rhode Island 210 314.95 94.82 0.58 0.16 28.91 5.24
South Carolina 869 228.53 31.18 0.48 0.21 29.15 6.51
Tennessee 1,120 169.55 39.29 0.41 0.17 28.20 6.50
Texas 4,923 223.50 70.31 0.47 0.18 27.00 5.81
Utah 484 247.72 77.76 0.47 0.16 27.38 5.62
Virginia 1,372 232.60 45.68 0.41 0.22 27.48 7.40
Washington 1,064 358.58 101.10 0.53 0.20 30.11 6.08
West Virginia 556 200.71 89.50 0.51 0.09 32.29 6.50
Wisconsin 1,446 247.26 63.07 0.45 0.16 31.02 6.24
Benefits are calculated based on the Unemployment Insurance rules for a given state and year with the benefit calculator used in Chetty (2008).
Calculated nominal weekly benefits and replacement rates are not adjusted for eligibility criteria.
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Table Ill: Effect of Variation in the Replacement Rate on Financial Wealth
Column 11 111 IV V VI Engen & Gruber
Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial
Dependent Variable Wealth/Income Wealth/income Wealth/Income Wealth/Income Wealth/Income Wealth/income Wealth/income
Sample Years 1990-2003 1990-2003 1990-2003 1990-2003 1990-2003 1990-2003 1984-1990
Method OLS OLS RF IV IV IV IV
Replacement Rates 0.524** 1.425** -1.03 -0.908 -0.591 -0.908 -0.0362**
[0.145] [0.366] [0.719] [0.625] [0.555] [0.725] [0.0114]
Number of 58,915 58,915 58,915 58,915 58,915 58,915 24,904
Observations
State and Year Fixed X
Effects
Demographic Controls
Spline Controls X
Clustered Standard
Errors X X X X X
* = Significant at 10% level, = Significant at 5% level
The mean and median financial wealth to income ratios on the 1990-2003 sample are 0.539 and 0.0407, respectively.
Columns I and 11 use the individual-varying simulated replacement rate as the identifying variable.
Columns Ill-VI use the simulated instrument as the identifying variable: Column Ill is estimated through ordinary least squares on the instrument itself; Columns
IV-VI are estimated through two stage least squares.
Column VI presents the coefficients from a similar specification as in Engen and Gruber (2001). Column IV contains the same specification, with standard errors
clustered at the state level. The "Engen & Gruber" Column contains the comparable point estimate from their paper.
When indicated, demographic controls include a cubic polynomial in the age and earnings of the head of household, gender and marital status fixed effects, the
number of children in the household, racial fixed effects, the level of education in the household, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the spouse of
the head of household was also employed. These controls absorb roughly 69 percent of the total variation in simulated replacement rates.
Spline controls replace the ordinary polynomials in age and income with flexible five and seven knot cubic splines respectively. Knots are placed for every ten
years of age and twenty thousand dollars of earned income.
When indicated, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level.
The F-statistic from the First Stage regression of the calculated replacement rate on the simulated instrument replacement rate is 2728.86.
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Table IV: Selected Coefficients on Covariate Controls
Ill) I IV
Financial Financial
Wealth/income Wealth/Income
1990-2003 1990-2003
Column (from Table I
Dependent Variable
Sample Years
Method
Replacement Rates
Age
Wage
Number of Children
Married Fixed Effect
Spouse Employment Fixed Effect
Male Fixed Effect
OLS
1.425**
[0.366]
0.234**
[0.0924]
-0.000001 -0.000014**
[0.000002] [0.0000035]
-0.044**
[0.0080]
0.322**
[0.544]
0.0059
[0.0337]
0.136**
[0.0504]
Number of Observations 58,915 58,915 37,977
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Clustered Standard Errors X X X
* = Significant at 10% level, ** = Significant at 5% level
The mean and median financial wealth to income ratios on the 1990-2003 sample are 0.539 and
0.0407, respectively.
Column II uses the individual-varying simulated replacement rate as the identifying variable.
Columns IV and V use the simulated instrument as the identifying variable.
When indicated, demographic controls include a cubic polynomial in the age and earnings of
the head of household, gender and marital status fixed effects, the number of children in the
household, racial fixed effects, the level of education in the household, and a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the spouse of the head of household was also employed. These
controls absorb roughly 69 percent of the total variation in simulated replacement rates.
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IV
-0.908
[0.625]
0.230**
[0.089]
V
Financial
Wealth/Income
1996-2003
IV
-1.028
[1.577]
0.241
[0.152]
-0.000014*
[0.000008]
-0.030**
[0.0119]
0.338**
[0.0586]
-0.0129
[0.0421]
0.151**
[0.0616]
-0.035**
[0.0085]
0.319**
[0.0528]
0.0033
[0.0325]
0.173**
[0.0528]
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Table V: Incorporating Maximum Benefit Durations
Column 1 11 1ii IV V VI
Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial
Dependent Variable Wealth/Income Wealth/income Wealth/Income Wealth/Income Wealth/income Wealth/Income
Method OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Replacement Rates 0.0744 -0.591 ... ... 0.126 -0.526
[0.444] [0.555] [0.496] [0.563]
Maximum Benefit Duration ... ... 0.0023 -0.0228 0.003 -0.0229
[0.0050] [0.0153] [0.006] [0.0151]
Number of Observations 58,915 58,915 58,915 58,915 58,915 58,915
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
Spline Controls X X X X X X
Clustered Standard Errors X X X X X X
* = Significant at 10% level, ** = Significant at 5% level
The mean and median financial wealth to income ratios on the 1990-2003 sample are 0.539 and 0.0407, respectively.
Columns I, Ill, and V use the individual-varying simulated replacement rate as the identifying variable.
Columns II, IV, and VI use the simulated instrument as the identifying variable and are estimated through two-stage least squares
When indicated, demographic controls include a cubic polynomial in the age and earnings of the head of household, gender and marital status
fixed effects, the number of children in the household, racial fixed effects, the level of education in the household, and a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the spouse of the head of household was also employed. These controls absorb roughly 69% of the total variation in
simulated replacement rates and 75% of the variation in benefit durations.
Spline controls replace the ordinary polynomials in age and income with flexible five and seven knot cubic splines respectively. Knots are
placed for every ten years of age and twenty thousand dollars of earned income.
When indicated, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level.
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Table VI: Alternate Dependent Variable Transformations
Column I 11 111 IV V vi
Dependent Variable
Method
Percentile
Replacement Rates
Maximum Benefit Durations
Number of Observations
State and Year Fixed Effects
Demographic Controls
Spline Controls
Bootstrapped Standard Errors
Standard Errors are in Brackets.
Financial Log (Financial- Log (Financial-
Wealth/Income Wealth) Wealth / Income) Financial Wealth Financial Wealth Financial Wealth
IV Quantile Reduced Quantile Reduced Quantile ReducedForm Form Form
30th 50th 70th
-0.526
[0.563]
-0.023
[0.015]
58,915
X
X
X
-0.681*
[0.413]
-0.003
[0.0055]
44,427
X
X
X
-0.689
[0.421]
-0.0029
[0.0061]
44,427
X
X
X
-279.36 -722.74 20037.61
[1831.63] [47110.2] [106827.3]
3.694
[15.679]
58,915
X
X
X
Standard Errors are Bootstrapped for Quantile Regression with 200 repetitions.
3.637
[24.457]
58,915
X
X
X
X
-83.27
[903.65]
58,915
X
X
X
X
* = Significant at 10% level, ** = Significant at 5% level
The mean and median log financial wealth on the 1990-2003 sample are 7.93 and 8.00, respectively.
The mean and median log financial wealth to income ratios on the 1990-2003 sample are -2.37 and -2.32 respectively.
The 30th, 50th and 70th percentile for Financial Wealth are $100, $1100, and $5500 respectively.
Columns 1-111 are estimated via two stage least squares. Columns IV -VI are estimated via a reduced form Quantile Regression on the instruments
directly.
When indicated, demographic controls include a cubic polynomial in the age and earnings of the head of household, gender and marital status
fixed effects, the number of children in the household, racial fixed effects, the level of education in the household, and a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the spouse of the head of household was also employed. These controls absorb roughly 69% of the total variation in
simulated replacement rates and 75% of the variation in benefit durations.
Spline controls replace the ordinary polynomials in age and income with flexible five and seven knot cubic splines respectively. Knots are placed
for every ten years of age and twenty thousand dollars of earned income.
138
Tables
Table VII: Heterogeneous Response by Unemployment Probability
Column I II III IV
Dependent Variable Financial Financial Financial FinancialWealth/Income Wealth/income Wealth/Income Wealth/Income
Method
Replacement Rates
Maximum Benefit Duration
RR * High Probability
Duration * High Probability
High Probability
Number of Observations
State and Year Fixed Effects
Demographic Controls
Spline Controls
Bootstrapped Standard Errors
IV 2 Step IV IV 2 Step IV
-0.591 -0.4684 -0.526
[0.555] [-1.232,0.503] [0.563]
-0.074
[-0.431,0.293]
-0.0229 0.000123
[0.0151] [-0.004,0.004]
-0.2127
[-1.485,0.782]
-0.181
[-0.589,0.145]
... -0.00199
[-0.006,0.0013]
0.131
[-0.332,0.686]
58,915
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
0.179
[-0.064,0.423]
58,915
X
X
X
X
Standard Errors are in Brackets. For two step estimation, the 95% confidence interval is in brackets.
* = Significant at 10% level, ** = Significant at 5% level
The mean and median financial wealth to income ratios on the 1990-2003 sample are 0.539 and 0.0407,
respectively.
All columns are estimated via two stage least squares.
When indicated, demographic controls include a cubic polynomial in the age and earnings of the head of
household, gender and marital status fixed effects, the number of children in the household, racial fixed
effects, the level of education in the household, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the
spouse of the head of household was also employed. These controls absorb roughly 69% of the total
variation in simulated replacement rates and 75% of the variation in benefit durations.
Spline controls replace the ordinary polynomials in age and income with flexible five and seven knot cubic
splines respectively. Knots are placed for every ten yeass of age and twenty thousand dollars of earned
income.
All specifications that include a high probability fixed effect (Column il and Column IV) are defined as
follows: the high probability variable is equal to one if the probability of the head of household's
unemployment is above the median probability in that year. These probabilities are estimated by an OLS
regression of unemployment outcomes on the full suite of demographic controls, state and year fixed
effects, and dummies for the two digit industry code where the head of household is employed. The two-
step estimation procedure is bootstrapped with 100 repetitions to generate consistent standard errors.
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Table VIII: Portfolio Choice
Column
Dependent Variable
Method
Replacement Rates
1 11
Financial Liquid
Wealth/income Wealth/Income
-0.591
[0.555]
0.0281
[0.055]
Ill
Non-
Precautionary
Wealth/Income
IV
-0.126
[0.1461
Maximum Benefit Duration
VI
Financial Liquid
Wealth/income Wealth/Income
-0.526
[0.563]
-0.023
[0.015]
N
Preca
Wealt
0.03
[0.0554]
-0.0006
[0.00062]
IX
NI
Financial Liquid
utionary Precautionary
h/lncome Wealth/income Wealth/Income Wealth/Income
IV 2 Step IV 2 Step IV 2 Step IV
-0.123 -0.074 0.021 -0.0711
[0.149] [-0.431,0.293] [-0.739,0.145] [-0.440,0.283]
-0.001 0.000123 -0.0015** 0.0005
[0.002] [-0.004,0.004] [-0.003,-0.0001] [-0.0036,0.0046]
RR * High Probability
-0.181 0.014 -0.0866
[-0.589,0.145] [-0.072,0.098] [-0.491,0.247]
Duration * High Probability
High Probability
Number of Observations
State and Year Fixed Effects
Demographic Controls
Spline Controls
Clustered Standard Errors
Bootstrapped Standard Errors
... -0.00199 0.0013** -0.002
[-0.006,0.0013] [0.00037,0.0022] [-0.0059,0.0013]
... 0.179 -0.0427* 0.111
[-0.064,0.423] [-0.087,0.00299] [-0.111,0.348]
58,915
X
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
X
58,915
X
X
X
X
Standard Errors are in Brackets. Fortwo step estimation, the 95% confidence interval is in brackets.
* = Significant at 10% level, ** = Significant at 5% level
The mean and median financial wealth to income ratios on the 1990-2003 sample are 0.539 and 0.0407, respectively.
The mean and median liquid wealth to income ratios on the 1990-2003 sample are 0.118 and 0.199 respectively.
The mean and median non-precautionary wealth to income ratios on the 1990-2003 sample are 0.141 and 0.000 respectively.
Columns I-Ill include the replacement rate offered by unemployment insurance alone
All columns are estimated via two stage least squares.
When indicated, demographic controls include a cubic polynomial in the age and earnings of the head of household, gender and marital status fixed effects, the number of children
in the household, racial fixed effects, the level of education in the household, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the spouse of the head of household was also
employed. These controls absorb roughly 69 percent of the total variation in simulated replacement rates and 75% of the variation in benefit durations.
Spline controls replace the ordinary polynomials in age and income with flexible five and seven knot cubic splines respectively.
When indicated, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level.
All specifications that include a high probability fixed effect (columns VII-IX) are defined as follows: the high probability variable is equal to one if the probability of the head of
household's unemployment is above the median probability in that year. These probabilities are estimated by an OLS regression of unemployment outcomes on the full suite of
demographic controls, state and year fixed effects, and dummies for the two digit industry code where the head of household is employed. The two-step estimation procedure is
bootstrapped with 100 repetitions to generate consistent standard errors.
